Posted By  admin on September 12, 2015    
				
				          Six Day War - (In Hebrew - Mil'hement          sheshet Hayamim). A war between Israel and Egypt, Jordan          and Syria that began on June 5, 1967 and ended on June 10          1967. In the war, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula,          the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan          Heights.        
                    1967 Six Day War Timeline (chronology)           Israel          Intelligence Timeline 1961-1967        
          Background        
          The Six Day War occurred against the background of          continuing Arab world hostility to the State of Israel, which          had begun with the           War of Independence. In that war, the newly created          state of Israel had defeated the Arab armies that had          invaded it, and expanded its territory. The war had          created about 700,000 Palestinian Arab refugees, who fled          or were expelled in 1948.        
          Officially, no Arab country recognized the          armistice lines of 1949 as international borders, and no          Arab country recognized Israel,          diplomatically. Israel,          according to Arab rhetoric, had no right to exist, and          was referred to as "The Zionist entity." Defeating and          destroying Israel and "reversing the results of 1948"          became central goals of Arab political rhetoric. Prestige          and leadership of the Arab world were based on leadership          in confrontation of Israel.        
          Gamal Abdul Nasser and his fellow officers had          taken power in Egypt, in order they claimed, to modernize          the country and undo the shame of the lost 1948 war.          However, in 1956, after Nasser closed the straits of          Tiran and Suez canal to Israeli shipping and moved terror          squads into the Sinai peninsula, Israel, Britain and          France attacked Egypt. Israel captured the entire Sinai          peninsula in 100 hours. Before agreeing to withdraw,          Israel got an           Aide de Memoire from the US that it would support          Israel's right to unrestricted access to the straits of          Tiran, in accordance with international law, and the UN          agreed to station an emergency force in Sinai          (UNEF).        
          Nasser claimed a "victory" in that he had gotten          Israel, Britain and France to withdraw, but the UNEF and          the free access of Israeli shipping were a constant          shameful reminder. Nasser bid to lead the Arab world, but          his plans foundered in economic woes and a failed war in          Yemen, evoking inter-Arab rivalry. Constant taunts dared          Nasser to dismiss the UNEF and close the straits of          Tiran.        
          Tension began developing between Israel and Arab          countries in the 1960s. Israel began to implement its          National Water Carrier plan, which pumps water from the          Sea of Galilee to irrigate south and central Israel. The          project was in accordance with a plan proposed by US          envoy Eric Johnston in 1955, and agreed to by Arab          engineers. Arab governments refused to participate          however, because of the implied recognition of Israel. In          secret meetings, Israel and Jordan agreed to abide by the          water quotas set by the plan.        
          The newly formed Palestinian Fatah movement          seized on the Israeli diversion as an "imperialist event"          that would catalyze their revolution, and Yasser          Arafat began calling for war to eliminate Israel. In          the Fatah newspaper, Filistinunah, ("our Palestine")          Arafat ridiculed Egyptian President Nasser and other Arab          leaders for their impotence, and called for effective          action against Israel. Nasser decided to found the          Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a "tame"          alternative to the Fatah, and placed Ahmed Shukhairy, an          ineffective and bombastic diplomat at its          head.        
          The Syrians, who had broken with Nasser's          pan-Arabism, countered by supporting Fatah and attempted          to take over the Fatah group. Syrian army          intelligence recruited terrorists for actions          against Israel, giving credit for the operations to          Fatah. The first of these actions was announced on          December 31, 1964, an attack on the Israel water carrier          at Beit Netopha, but in fact no attack had taken place. A          second attempt was made on January 2, 1965, but the          explosives charge was disarmed. However, successful          attacks soon followed on January 14 and February 28. In          the 18 months preceding the war, there ware 120 terror          attacks, resulting in 11 fatalities. These minor          terrorist activities received great publicity in the Arab          world, and were contrasted with the lack of action and          bombastic talk of Gamal Nasser, challenging Nasser's          leadership. This ferment is considered the catalyst of          the events that brought about the Six day war. It is a          moot point whether it is to be attributed to Syrian          rivalry with Nasser, or as Yasser Arafat and the          Palestinians claim, to the Fatah movement. Faced with the          "heroic" deeds of the Palestinians under Syrian tutelage,          Nasser was pushed to an increasingly bellicose          stance.        
          In several          summit conferences beginning in 1964, Arab leaders          ratified the establishment of the PLO, declared          their resolve to destroy Israel, and decided to divert          the sources of the Jordan river that feed the Sea of          Galilee, to prevent Israel from implementing the water          carrier plan. The Syrians and Lebanese began to implement          the diversions. Israel responded by firing on the          tractors and equipment doing the work in Syria, using          increasingly accurate and longer range guns as the          Syrians moved the equipment from the border. This was          followed by Israeli attempts to cultivate the          demilitarized zones (DMZ) as provided in the armistice          agreements. Israel was within its rights according to the          armistice agreements, but           Moshe Dayan claimed many years later that 80% of the          incidents were deliberately provoked. In reality, the          incidents were provoked in order to draw artillery fire,          so that Israel would have an excuse to fire on the          equipment being used by the Syrians for diversion of the          headwaters of the Jordan. The Syrians responded by firing          in the DMZs (Click          here for a map of the demilitarized zones). When          Israelis responded in force, Syria began shelling Israeli          towns in the north, and the conflict escalated into air          strikes. The USSR was intent on protecting the new          Ba'athist pro-Soviet government of Syria, and represented          to the Syrians and Egyptians that Israel was preparing to          attack Syria. As tension rose, Syria appealed to Egypt,          believing the claim of the USSR that Israel was massing          troops on the Syrian border. The claim was false and was          denied by the UN.        
          Beginning in May 1967, unprovoked actions by          Nasser and other Arab leaders created a feeling of          impending disaster in Israel. Actions by the United          States and UN, and lack of action, gave every reason to          believe that the world intended to abandon Israel to          whatever aggressive plans Nasser might have. Nasser,          motivated by the need to re-assert leadership in the Arab          world, was "pushing the envelope." It was felt that          inaction by Israel in the best case would result in          dangerous concessions, and in the worst case would goad          Nasser and his allies into a devastating first strike          attack. Hindsight has shown that the Arabs were no match          for Israel. However it is also clear from the record that          the feeling that the US would not honor its commitments          was probably justified, and that had Israel not acted, it          is almost certain that Egypt would have been able to          close the Straits of Tiran permanently to Israeli          shipping. It is probable, according to several          sources, that the Egyptians were planning to attack          Israel, though pressure from USSR forced them to abandon          the plan.        
          On May 14, Israeli intelligence noted that          Nasser had moved considerable forces into the Sinai          desert. On the same day, Egypt asked for          withdrawal of the UNEF forces. Secretary General U Thant          stalled for time. On May 16, 1967, a Radio Cairo          broadcast stated: "The existence of Israel has continued          too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We welcome          the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come.          The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel."          Egypt repeated the request to withdraw UNEF forces on May          16, and UN Secretary General U Thant agreed to remove the          troops on May 18. Formally, the troops could only be          stationed in Egypt with Egyptian agreement. However, it          had been believed believed that Nasser had really hoped U          Thant would not remove the troops, and that he could use          the presence of the UN troops as an excuse to do          nothing.        
          Since the reaction to removal of UN troops          was tepid, Nasser surmised that neither Israel nor the US          would obstruct his ambitions. On May 23, Nasser closed          the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The          United States failed to live up to its guarantees of          freedom of the waterways to Israel. A torrent of rhetoric          issued from Arab capitals and Arab representatives to the          UN. In the Arab world, Nasser, previously chided for          inaction, was widely hailed as a liberator. Cartoons          showed jackbooted Egyptian soldiers crushing caricatures          of ghetto Jews.        
          At the UN, PLO Chairman Ahmed Shukhairy          announced that "if it will be our privilege to strike the          first blow" the PLO would expel from Palestine all          Zionists who had arrived after 1917 and eliminate the          state of Israel.          In a speech          to Arab Trade Unionists on May 26, 1967, Nasser          justified the dismissal of the UNEF, and made it clear          that Egypt was prepared to fight Israel for Palestinian          rights. He also attacked the Jordanians as tools of the          imperialists, stepping up the constant pressure on          Jordan's King Hussein.        
          The US was caught by surprise by developments          in the Middle East, but it may have unwittingly          contributed to the crisis. In January of 1967, Senator          Symington discussed          his recent trip to the Middle East in the Senate Foreign          Relations Committee. Symington noted that US          diplomats were disturbed by the big Israeli retaliatory          raid on November 13, 1966 in Samu, in the West Bank (then          under Jordanian control). The US had apparently developed          the theory that Israel was attacking Jordan rather than          Syria or Egypt, because Jordan was a US client and would          be restrained by the US. The attack had weakened King          Hussein. These concerns must have been impressed on the          Israelis, who thereafter may have focused more attention          on Syria.        
          In assessing the situation in the Middle East          shortly thereafter, on           January 16, 1967, Secretary State Dean Rusk delivered          himself of three pronouncements which indicate that he,          and apparently the entire US diplomatic establishment,          were either blissfully ignorant of the situation or else          they were unwilling to share their knowledge with the          Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He asserted that the          tension between Israel and Syria was due to a dispute          over the borders in the demilitarized zone. It was          in fact due to Syrian efforts to divert the sources of          the Jordan. He asserted that Fatah terrorists were not          being supported by Arab governments, whereas in fact they          were trained and apparently armed by Syrian military          intelligence. Rusk's biggest error was that predicted          that there would not be a war. These were not failures of          insight or intelligence gathering. The decisions of the          Arab summits were a matter of public record. They created          the PLO to carry on "armed struggle" against Israel. They          decided on the Jordan diversion scheme. They announced          their plans to destroy Israel, in a time table that          envisioned a war in 1968. All this was known, and yet          Rusk claimed he did not have evidence of Syrian          involvement and didn't think there would be a war,          because neither side wanted one! None of the committee          members challenged him.        
          A major insight into United States policy          toward Israel and the Middle East is gained from a          singular revelation. In 1967, the United States had a                    plan to intervene militarily in the Middle East,          including an attack on Israel, should the integrity          of any nation be threatened. The United States was          apparently seriously contemplating military intervention          against Israel, as well as against Arab nations in the          event of a war. This puts into stark perspective the          empty reality behind the proclamations of generations of          United States politicians regarding the "special          relationship" of Israel with the United States. In          reality, the relation to Israel is variable. The State          Department tends to favor Arab states, while presidents          at least feel they must pay lip-service to the "special          relationship" with Israel. Myths about the "Israel          Lobby" to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no          reason to assume the United States will stand by          commitments it has made to Israel if it decided it was          inconvenient to do so, in view of the evasive behavior of          the U.S. government in the critical period preceding the          Six Day War. This is especially underlined by the fact          that Lyndon Johnson was known to be a "special friend" of          Israel.        
          Israeli diplomats repeatedly implored U.S.          President Johnson to make good on the US pledge to allow          Israel freedom of navigation in the straits of Tiran, or          to support Israeli military action. The US, for its part,          publicly insisted that it was working to assemble an          international force that would open the straits, a          "Regatta." It developed that France and Britain were cool          to the idea, and President Johnson found that the US          congress was unwilling to back involvement in another          military adventure, given the problems the US was facing          in Vietnam. From Damascus,           U.S. ambassador Smythe telegraphed that U.S. attempts          to open the straits of Tiran would meet with opposition          of the 'monolithic Arab nation,' that the attempt was          "foredoomed," and that Israel was an unviable client          state, which did not merit US support. Oil          interests including the           Aramco company warned against US support for Israeli          navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba:        
          The Israeli government probably did not want          war, and some at least were fearful of war.           Ben-Gurion berated Chief of Staff Yitzhak          Rabin for making aggressive statements that had,          according to him, escalated the conflict and gotten          Israel into trouble.        
          Israeli Foreign Minister Abba          Eban was sent to the US on May 25th. His          missions were to get from the United States some          guarantee against an Egyptian attack and some firm action          to break the blockade of the straits of Tiran.          Prime Minister           Levi Eshkol needed these in order to fight pressure          to launch an immediate attack.        
          Israel presented an intelligence estimate to          the US on May 25th, coinciding with Eban's arrival,          according to which an Egyptian attack in Sinai was          imminent. Some sources claim that this was a deliberate          exaggeration meant to goad the US into supportive action.          The CIA dismissed the estimate as unfounded. In Six Days          of War, (Oxford, 2002) Michael Oren, relying primarily on          Egyptian sources, details an Egyptian plan to attack          Israel, operation fajr (Dawn), that was          supposedly detected by Israel and stopped by US and          Soviet intervention a few hours before it was to take          place in the early morning of May 27, 1967. The same plan          is mentioned in other sources (e.g. Benny Morris,          Righteous Victims, 1999, page 307). It is unclear          if Israel had this information on May 25. US          sources declassified to date do not give give any          indication of this purported attack plan. A           CIA estimate of May 25, which "scrubbed" the Israeli          estimate, claimed that Nasser and Syria were dragged into          the conflict by inter-Arab rivalry and did not          contemplate a war.        
          Abba          Eban got nothing. He was turned down by           Secretary of State Dean Rusk He was turned down          by           Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and he was          turned down, essentially by           President Johnson. The US could not commit itself to          the defense of Israel for constitutional reasons,          according to the administration. The US could not          establish any intelligence or military liaison with          Israel. The US could not open the straits of Tiran alone          without first attempting to do so through a          multinational force or the UN. Israel must not          attack the Arabs. These messages were contained in a          written statement that President Johnson handed Eban at          their meeting on May 26. The same constitutional reasons,          one may point out, did not prevent the United States from          becoming involved in a war to defend South          Vietnam.        
          It is clear from declassified documents that          the US was interested in restraining Israel solely          because it was concerned for its own interests in the          Middle East and fearful of economic repercussions, and          that the US would be unable, in the end, to actually open          the straits of Tiran, owing to Arab objections. A          memorandum from Dean          Rusk to President Johnson on May 26, preparatory to          Johnson's meeting with Abba          Eban states:        
            You have two basic options            now:          
            (1) to let the Israelis decide how best to            protect their own national interests, in the light of            the advice we have given them: i.e., to "unleash" them.            We recommend strongly against this            option.          
            (2) To take a positive position, but not a            final commitment, on the British proposal. The British            Cabinet meets on the plan tomorrow.          
            We recommend this policy, as our best            hope of preventing a war which could gravely damage            many American national interests.          
          In the same document, U.S. Ambassador to the          UN Arthur Goldberg is quoted as advising a "compromise"          that would give Nasser a victory: "Non-Strategic" Israeli          cargos would be allowed through the straits of Tiran          bound for the port of Eilat in ships flying foreign          flags. "Strategic" cargos presumably included oil          tankers.        
          On May 29,          1967, Nasser gave a bellicose speech to the Egyptian          National Assemblyly, stating,"God will          surely help and urge us to restore the situation to what          it was in 1948." Intelligence reports to the contrary          notwithstanding, rhetoric and actions in the Arab world          were making it clear that the Arab leaders were serious          about destroying Israel.        
          On May 30, a           letter sent by Levi Eshkol again asked for some          sign that the US was going to make good on its          commitments, or release Israel from its commitment to          restraint. On the same day, Jordan signed a defense pact          with Egypt, readying itself for war. King Hussein stated:          "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are          poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge,          while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria,          Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will          astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs          are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived.          We have reached the stage of serious action and not          declarations."        
                  Arab Defense Pact                
          In the few days since Eban's mission,          the UN debate had finished without result, the "Regatta"          was showing itself to be impractical, the Arabs had          signed a defense pact, and the US had come to understand          quite well that Israel was losing ground and taking          risks.        
          A fair appreciation of the situation          was given by Harold          Saunders on May 31. Saunders made the following          points:        
          Israel had suffered from the          restraint: "It seems that the UAR          has won all the chips to date."        
          Restraining Israel was a mistakeke:          "By not stopping an Israeli strike as early          as 21 May when Egyptian positions were still fluid, we          would probably have witnessed a limited Arab defeat and          then had to move the international machinery in to          restore peace....{A]ssuming she held her own, we          would not have been linked with Israel and she would have          brought to bear the only counter that the US or anyone          else has yet found to the war of national          liberation-force. Nasser as a dominating force would have          been physically weakened, and the moderate governments          might have been freed to ignore him and concentrate on          their own development in association with          us.        
          Now US was linked with Israel, and would          be even more committed:        
          For twenty years Israel has sought a          special relationship-even a private security          guarantee-with us. We have steadfastly refused in order          to preserve our other interests in the Middle East. We          argued that our policy worked to Israel's best interest          too. Now we are committed to side with Israel and, in          opening the Straits of Tiran, even to wage war on the          Arabs. In short, we have chosen sides-not with the          constructive Arabs and Israel but with Israel alone          against all the Arabs.        
          Whoever is the bigger winner, we are the sure          loser. If we follow our present course, we stand to lose          economically (see the Task Force's rundown of the          "economic vulnerabilities") and to suffer substantial          Soviet gains. If we back away from Israel, we're a paper          tiger. In building a new Middle East along the regional          lines in your vision, the closer we get to Israel, the          longer we delay our constructive contribution to make          that vision a reality.        
          U.S. should let Israel "go it          alone" Eshkol himself says he'll have to          go this route within a week or two if we can't produce.          He's correct that we don't have any right to hold him          back longer while his enemy gets stronger unless we're          willing to take on the Arabs ourselves. Pretty soon we'll          have Soviet warships in the Red Sea. We ought to consider          admitting that we have failed and allow fighting to          ensue.        
          Nonetheless, President Johnson did not          change his policy. He finally replied to Levy Eshkol's          letter           on June 3. He said nothing. He reiterated the          same points he had made to Abba Eban earlier. In fact, he          included the same written document. When war broke          out on June 5, State Department Spokesman Robert          McCloskey said, in an infamous communique, was to say          that "the U.S. position is neutral in word, thought and          deed."        
          US and Israeli assessments were that          Israel would win any war handily, despite the huge          superiority in armor, aircraft, and troops favoring the          combined forces of the Arab countries. US officials          publicly told Israeli officials that by waiting and not          attacking that they had gained and not lost, but US          intelligence estimates and secret documents reveal that          the US was well aware that Israel faced risks and also          understood quite well that Nasser had won the first          round. Israel estimated they might lose 4,000 dead, and          had dug 10,000 graves and prepared some 14,000 hospital          beds. The US had several estimates. .           One CIA estimate insisted that Israel would beat the          Arabs handily, predicated on the notion that Israel would          lose half its air force in a surprise attack and still be          in a condition to be resupplied. The                    National board of estimates was a bit          more realistic and frank. It noted:        
              The Israelis face dismaying              choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action,              they failed to take the instant military              counteraction which might have been most effective.              If they attack now they will face far more formidable              opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We              believe that they would still be able to drive the              Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of              Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses              of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have              sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for              a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it              is possible that they would not embark upon a major              campaign without prior assurances from the US of              adequate resupply.            
          Israel opts for          war        
          Against this background, pressure grew          in Israel. When Hussein signed the pact with Nasser on          May 30, it astounded the world indeed. Most especially,          it astounded and alarmed Israeli military intelligence          and the IDF General Staff. The Nasser - Hussein pact made          war inevitable. Mobilization was expensive, diplomatic          efforts were producing no results. In Israel,          mobilization paralyzes the economy, since every          able-bodied is removed from the work force. Israeli Prime          Minister           Levi Eshkol appeared hesitant, and supposedly          stuttered in a dramatic radio speech to the nation on May          28. (see           Levi Eshkol radio address, 1967). IDF officers          began pressuring the civilian establishment to declare          war, because it was considered that an Arab attack might          be imminent, and because Israel's ability to maintain its          army fully mobilized is limited, but Prime Minister          Eshkol was reluctant to take action, and Foreign          Minister Abba          Eban opposed unilateral action, which he          believed would be against the wishes of the United          States. However, with virtually nothing in hand from the          United States, Eban's voice carried little weight.          Ariel          Sharon admitted later that he and others,          including Yitzhak Rabin, had discussed the possibility of          a sort of coup, in which government officials were to be          locked in a room, while the army started the war, but the          idea never got past the stage of thinking out loud. Some          claim that this was only a          joke.        
          The government of           Levi Eshkol, under severe pressure, had been          expanded June 1 to include Moshe Dayan as Defense          Minister and the right wing Herut party of Mr.          Begin. Johnson had taken four or five days to reply          to P.M. Eshkol's earlier urgent plea for help sent May          30, the reply was not a cause for          optimism.        
          On June 4, Iraq likewise joined a          military alliance with Egypt and committed itself to war.          On May 31, the Iraqi President Rahman Aref announced,          "This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which          has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear--to wipe          Israel off the map."        
          Mossad chief Meir          Amit had been dispatched to Washington and returned,          either with an assessment that the US would not stand in          the way, or more likely with an assessment that the US          would not do anything for Israel, and therefore there was          not point in waiting in any case. When the Israel cabinet          met on the morning of Sunday June 4, it had Amit's          assessment, it also had Johnson's letter before it,          indicating the intransigence of the United States. Moshe          Dayan, who had become Defense Minister June 1, had been          feverishly preparing for war.        
          Armaments and Battle          Array        
          Estimates of armaments and troops          vary.        
          Summary:        
          Israel: 275,000 troops (of which          about 200,000 were reserves) 200 aircraft, 1,100 tanks,          (According to Oren, 2002, page 168, but on page 171 he          states that there were 250 aircraft). or 250,000 troops,          192 combat aircraft, 40 trainers, 1100 tanks, 400 guns          and heavy mortars (Morris, Righteous Victims, 1999 page          311).        
          Total Arab forces: About 250,000          troops (not counting 50,000 in Yemen) 530 aircraft, 1,500          tanks (some sources claim 2,800 tanks), broken down as          follows:        
            Egypt: 180,000 troops (of            which 50,000 were deployed in Yemen - some of these            were returned to Sinai), About 420 aircraft, of which            242 were MiG fighters, and the rest were apparently            Ilyushin and Topolev bombers and Sukhoi            fighter-bombers, 900 tanks, 800 artillery pieces            (Morris, page 312,318);          
            Jordan: 56,000 troops, 24            Hawker-Hunter jet fighters, 294 tanks (including            30 Iraqi), 194 artillery pieces (including 34 Iraqi)            (Morris, 1999, page 312). Jordanian troops were            reinforced with several Iraqi            brigades.          
            Syria: 70,000 troops, 92            fighter aircraft and two bombers, 300 tanks, 265            artillery pieces and heavy mortars (Morris, 1999, page            313).          
          The table shows all combat aircraft types of          each country. Syria and Egypt alone had over 500 aircraft          vs 343 for Israel, and they outclassed Israeli aircraft.          The Iraqi air force did not not commit most of its air          craft to the battle.        
          Six Day War: Detailed Air Battle          Array*        
                  Iraq                
            *Approximate numbers of all craft,            including those not in service. Israeli "fighter" air            craft total includes 45 Fouga Magister (Zukit) trainers            that were actually not suitable as fighters. It is not            clear if trainer aircraft of other countries are            included. Source          
          At the time, it was believed that the          Arab states had a decisive superiority in the number and          quality of weapons, and a potential superiority in          manpower, if all reserves were fielded. Prior to 1967,          Israel had gotten almost no military aid from the United          States. Egypt and Syria were equipped with large          quantities of the latest Soviet military equipment.          Israel's main arms supplier was France. Israel had          about half as many aircraft as the Egyptians, and the          Israeli aircraft were mostly old or of limited capacity.          They included 45 Fouga Magister trainer jets that were          used as decoys according to most accounts, 50 Ouragan          bombers, 20 Vautour light bombers, and 35 Mystere Mark IV          fighters, 35 Super Mystere and 65 Mirage IIIc fighters:          250 aircraft in all according to the estimate of Michael          Oren (Six Days of War, page 171). A more detailed listing          of the capabilities of these aircraft is given here:          Operation          Focus. Even the Mirages were no match in a dog          fight for the Mig-21 fighters acquired by Egypt from the          USSR, which had a rate of climb of about 120 m/s, versus          83 m/s for for the Mirage, of which Israel had 65. The          Arab states had over 300 MiG aircraft, of which about          half were MiG-21. The Mysteres in Israel's possession had          a top speed of Mach 1.1, about half that of the MiG-21 or          Mirage IIIc.        
          * Nominal specifications from various          sources, especially Fighter Planes and          The          Israel Air Force The payload of the MiG-21 is          not given in any available sources, but described as          "Small" Egypt probably had 100 or more of these          aircraft, as 90 were destroyed in the first wave of          attacks, along with 20 MiG 19 and 75 MiG 17. Rate          of climb depends on the fuel load of the craft, initial          speed and altitude. Maneuverability and similar issues          are not addressed in formal specifications, but may be          crucial in combat: Turn radius, stability, maximum dive          angle, max. climb angle, efficiency of the armament (the          last can only be determined in combat).                  
          On paper, the IDF had a large number of          "tanks" matching or almost matching the arms of the Arab          countries. However, while Syrians and Egyptians were          equipped with late model Soviet heavy tanks, many of the          Israeli "tanks" were in fact tiny French AMX anti-tank          vehicles, and most of the heavy tanks were either British          Centurions or refurbished WWII Sherman tanks fitted with          diesel engines and with 105 mm guns. Israel had also been          allowed to purchase an unknown number of M-48 Patton          tanks from Germany or the US in 1965. It is known that          the Germans had sold Israel at least 60 such tanks. In          1967 however, many of these tanks were being converted          from gasoline to diesel engines. The Israeli government          asked the Americans for 100 replacement tanks in May of          1967. However, these and all other arms requests          were refused.        
          Several factors dominated Israeli          strategy and concerns. The first was that the war had to          be over quickly. It was understood that as soon as Arab          states had suffered significant losses, they would sue          for a cease fire in the UN, backed by their Soviet          allies. The second was that Israel did not have the          troops or equipment to fight on three fronts at the same          time. Israel would have to gamble that the Jordanian and          Syrian fronts would remain relatively quiet until the          Egyptians were no longer a threat. The third was that          Israel would be using up war materiel rapidly, and with          no immediate prospect of replacements. Israeli roads were          poor by international standards, Jordanian and Syrian          roads were poorer, and Egyptian roads were virtually          nonexistent. Israel did not have sufficient numbers of          vehicles for troop transport. Therefore, civilian          vehicles of all sorts, including busses, sedans and          trucks, were "drafted" for the duration. Some of these          vehicles were in poor repair and were overcome by the          heat and long lines of vehicles, adding to the confusion.          That meant that the rapid Israeli advance caused          incredible traffic jams, with troop transports and armor          and guns snarled at critical junctions for hours,          limiting the possibility for rapid initial          deployment.        
          Detailed timing of battles:           1967 Six Day War Timeline (chronology)                  
          Operation Focus - (For detailed account see          - Operation          Focus) Israel attacked the Egyptians beginning          on June 5, 1967 at about 07:45 hours. Israeli radio          announced that Egyptians had opened fire and Israeli          forces were returning fire. A terse battle announcement          was repeated all through the morning of June 5, in which          Moshe Dayan said, "We are a small but brave nation, and          we shall overcome them." In the first hours of the war          (operation Moked or Operation          Focus), two waves of Israel Air Force attacks          destroyed about 286 enemy aircraft, mostly on the ground,          to achieve total air superiority. Almost every combat          aircraft in the IAF participated in each wave. The attack          was made possible in part by the excellent training and          organization of ground crews, which could turn around          returning aircraft, fully armed and refueled, in a few          minutes.        
          By about 08:30 hours it was understood          that the attack was a total and almost unbelievable          success, but most Israelis did not know that until the          following day. By 10:35 hours, Israeli Air Force          Commander Moti Hod could say, "The Egyptian Air Force has          ceased to exist." The Egyptian air force announced,          however, that it had downed about 160 Israeli aircraft          and was winning the war. Egyptian radio broadcasts          continued to insist they were winning throughout the          first day.        
          Egyptian response was minimal. Marshall          Amer was in the air that morning and had ordered          anti-aircraft defenses not to fire at anything, for fear          of hitting his plane. The Egyptians were left with          35 operational aircraft.        
                  Israel Mirage Jets returning from                  Egyptt                
                  Egyptian Aircraft destroyed                  on the runway - Six Day War                
          Land War in Sinai - Israeli armor          executed a three pronged strike against Egypt. In the          north the three brigades of General Israel Tal's division          (ugdah - a reinforced division), crossed the          border at Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis. They          proceeded swiftly to the Rafah Gap, held by four Egyptian          divisions. Tal's division had 250 tanks, 50 guns, a          paratrooper brigade and a reconnaissance unit.          Following fierce battles led by Col. Shmuel Gonen,          Israeli armor broke through to the outskirts of El-Arish.          Israel lost 28 tanks, 93 men were wounded and 66          killed.        
          The central division led by Avraham Yoffe,          and the southern prong consisting of Ariel Sharon's          division, converged on the heavily defended and fortified          Umm Qatef (Abu-Ageila-Kusseima) region. Egyptian forces          there included one infantry division (the 2nd), a          battalion of tank destroyers and a tank          regiment.        
          Sharon sent two of his brigades to the north          of Um- Qatef, one to break through the defenses at          Abu-Ageila to the south, and the other to block the road          to El-Arish and to encircle Abu-Ageila from the east. At          the same time, a paratrooper force was landed there and          destroyed the artillery, preventing it from engaging          Israeli armor. Combined forces of armor, paratroopers,          infantry, artillery and combat engineers attacked the          Egyptian disposition from the front flanks and rear,          cutting the enemy off. The breakthrough battles which          were in sandy areas, three three thousand yard trenches,          and minefields, continued until June 8.        
          The Egyptians retreated in panic and amidst          numerous contradictory orders. The Israelis decided to          bypass the Egyptian units and destroy them in the          mountainous passes of West Sinai. By the evening of June          6, General Amer had ordered the Egyptians to retreat. The          Israelis hastened to cut off their retreat. On June 6 and          7 all three Israeli divisions, reinforced by two armored          brigades, rushed westwards to the passes. Sharon's          division first went southward then westward to Mitla          Pass. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's division,          while its other units blocked the Gidi Pass. Tal's units          stopped at various points along the length of the Suez          Canal.        
          Israel's blocking action was only partially          successful. The Gidi pass was captured before the          Egyptians approached it, but elsewhere some Egyptian          units did manage to pass through and cross the Canal to          safety.        
          Abba Eban had predicted Israel would have 72          hours before a cease fire was enforced, and his          predictions were approximately correct. However, the          cease fire efforts were held up initially, because,          incredibly, Nasser refused a cease fire offer on the          evening of June 7, unless Israel withdrew to the border.          The line was also taken by the Soviets. By the evening of          June 8, Nasser had accepted the cease fire, but Israeli          troops were in control of all of Sinai. Israel had          completed the conquest of the Sinai peninsula, sending          infantry units to Ras-Sudar on the western coast. Sharm          El-Sheikh was captured a day earlier by units of the          Israeli Navy. In four days, Israel defeated the largest          and most heavily equipped Arab army, leaving Sinai filled          with hundreds of burning or abandoned Egyptian          vehicles.        
                  Heliborne troops at the Suez Canal,                
          In order to excuse the loss, Egyptian          President Nasser fabricated the story that the United          States had given Israel air support from the sixth fleet,          and the British had collaborated as well. This story          spread rapidly throughout the Middle East. Mobs attacked          US and British embassies, oil shipments were embargoed,          and several countries broke off diplomatic relations with          the United States.        
          Israel intercepted a telephone call from          Nasser to Jordan's King Hussein, in which Nasser          explained how the story would be fabricated, and          coordinated the versions to be told. (For transcript and          background: Transcript          of Nasser-Hussein telephone conversation, June 6,          1967 ) At great political cost at home,          the US had refrained from giving Israel any material          support, in order to keep the friendship of moderate Arab          states. Nasser's fabrication set the Arab states against          the United States nonetheless, and in turn, helped          set the Americans against the Egyptians.        
          See maps: Map          of Egyptian Front Israel 6 Day War - June 5-6          Map          of Egyptian Front Israel 6 Day War - June          6-7        
          The Liberty - On June 8, 1967,          Israelis attacked and crippled a US CIA intelligence          ship, the Liberty, that had been stationed off the coast          of Gaza. Apparently, it was a case of mistaken identity,          though Liberty survivors insist that it was deliberate.          The Liberty had been ordered to move 100 miles off shore,          but it never received the order. Israelis claim they were          unable to identify the ship, and lacking the close          liaison they had repeatedly requested from the Americans,          they were unaware of the ship's position. They had          correctly identified the ship on the morning of June 8 as          American, but had lost contact by the afternoon.          Americans claim the ship was flying an American flag, but          Israeli pilots and a torpedo boat were unable to see any          flag.        
          Jordan - Jordanian artillery          began firing at Jerusalem on the first day of the war,          despite a warning by Israeli PM Levi Eshkol to stay out          of the war, and then the Jordan Legion advanced and took          over the headquarters of the UN (Governor's house - Armon          Hanatziv ) in Jerusalem. Jordanian artillery (155 mm US          Howitzers) fired on the suburbs of Tel Aviv, and at Ramat          David in the north. Jordanian Hawker-Hunters bombed          Netanya, Kfar Sirkin and Kfar Saba. The Soviet ambassador          to Jordan remarked to US Ambassador Burns, "Our estimate          is that if the Israelis do not receive arms, we think the          Arabs will win the war if they are allowed to fight it to          the finish."        
          After warning King Hussein repeatedly          to cease fire and withdraw, through the UN and through          the US, and after accepting a cease fire proposed by the          UN but rejected by Jordan, Israel attacked. Israel          destroyed the Jordanian air force on June 5, and then          proceeded to conquer the West Bank and East Jerusalem. on          June 6-8. The Jordan Legion put up stiff resistance in a          few battles, but they were no match for Israel,          especially after Israel had wiped out the Jordanian air          force. The Jordanian Patton tanks outranged the Israeli          Shermans. However, if the Sherman tanks could get in          close enough, they found that the weak point of the          Jordanian Patton tanks was their external auxiliary gas          tanks, which caught fire easily, and a fair number of          tanks were destroyed in this way.        
                  Israeli troops overlooking Jerusalem,                  19677                
                  Six Day War: Israeli soldiers at the Western Wall                
          Uzi Narkiss, Yigal Allon, Itzhak Rabin          and others certainly wanted to "finish" unfinished          business of 1948, conquer the old city and East          Jerusalem, avenge the 1948ethnic          cleansing of Jerusalem by the Jordan Legion, restore          the Jewish quarter and return to the Hebrew University          campus, that had been isolated on Mt. Scopus.           Jerusalem is an important national and religious          symbol for Zionism and for the Jewish people. On the          other hand, it was understood that because of Jerusalem's          never-implemented international status, and because of          its importance to Islam and Christianity, conquest of          Jerusalem could evoke serious opposition from West as          well as the Arab world, and would have diplomatic          repercussions. Once it was conquered, in Israel there          would be tremendous opposition to giving up any part of          it, and particularly the Temple Mount and wailing wall          (Western Wall) on religious and national          grounds.        
          See maps:           Map of Israel - Jerusalem front details in the 6 Day          War            Map of Jordanian Front in Israel 6-Day War          1967        
          Syria During the first          days of the war, Syrian artillery based in the Golan          Heights pounded civilian targets in northern Israel.          After dealing with Egypt, Israel decided to conquer the          Golan heights, despite opposition and doubts of some in          the government, including Moshe Dayan, who had been          appointed defense minister. On June 8, fear of          Soviet intervention caused the government to cancel a          planned strike on the Golan, due chiefly to the          opposition of Moshe Dayan. Both Chief of Staff Rabin and          head of the Northern Command David (Dado) Elazar were          frustrated by the decision. Dayan changed his mind,          apparently when intercepted communications made it          apparent that the Egyptian army had collapsed and that          the Syrian army was not in a position to offer serious          resistance. On June 9 Dayan authorized a limited attack,          operation Hammer. Syria claimed it was observing the          cease fire, and that Israel was violating it. Israel          claimed that Syrians were continuing to shell Israel.          Israeli credibility was aided by the fact that Syria          invented Israeli air attacks on Cairo and Damascus, and          announced the fall of Quneitra in the Golan          prematurely. It was clearly only a matter of hours          before pressure would mount to stop any Israeli          offensive. Because of the need for haste, bulldozers were          sent to storm the heights in exposed positions, suffering          high casualties. Syrian troops were well dug in in cement          pillboxes, and fought stubbornly in places like Tel al          Fakhr. However, the initial Syrian resistance soon          crumbled and Syrian troops began fleeing. At the same          time, pressure from the United States and USSR for a halt          to the advance mounted. Israel agreed to a cease          fire on June 10, 1967 after conquering Quneitra and          completed the conquest of the Golan Heights. UN Resolution 242          called for negotiations of a permanent peace between the          parties, and for Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied          in 1967.        
          See Map: Map          of Golan Front - Israel 6-Day          War        
          Military          Results        
          Israel captured 42,000 square miles of          territory. Israeli fatalities in the war were officially          given as 679 dead and 2,563 wounded, but may have been as          high as 800 dead eventually. Estimates of Arab casualties          vary from about 5,000 to as high as 21,000          dead1 and          45,000 wounded. Israel lost 15 prisoners of war. Israel          destroyed between 452 and 469 aircraft in all and lost          36. Israel captured almost 6,000 prisoners of war.          320 tanks, two SAM missile batteries 480 guns and 10,000          vehicles were captured from Egypt. Most of the rest of          the Egyptian hardware was destroyed. Jordan lost          179 tanks, and Syria lost 118          tanks.2The Arab          countries lost thousands of vehicles and artillery          pieces. Between 175,000 and 250,000 Palestinians          fled the West Bank for Jordan or were expelled.          France had declared an arms embargo on Israel before the          war, and the US did not accede to Israeli requests for          rearmament. Syria and Egypt rearmed          rapidly.        
          (see Note 2)        
                  Fighter and interceptor                
                  MiG-19                  'Farmer'                
                  MiG-17 'Fresco'                
                  Su-7                  'Fitter'                
                  Hawker                  Hunter                
                  Bomber                
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