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Unfinished Migrations: Diaspora – JSTOR

Posted By on November 5, 2015

African Studies Review

Description: African Studies Review, a multi-disciplinary scholarly journal, publishes original research and analyses of Africa and book reviews three times annually. It encourages scholarly debates across disciplines. The editing of the African Studies Review is supported by Five Colleges, Inc., a consortium representing Amherst College, Hampshire College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, and the University of Massachusetts.

Coverage: 1970-2011 (Vol. 13, No. 1 - Vol. 54, No. 3)

The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal. Moving walls are generally represented in years. In rare instances, a publisher has elected to have a "zero" moving wall, so their current issues are available in JSTOR shortly after publication. Note: In calculating the moving wall, the current year is not counted. For example, if the current year is 2008 and a journal has a 5 year moving wall, articles from the year 2002 are available.

ISSN: 00020206

EISSN: 15552462

Subjects: African Studies, Area Studies

Excerpt from:
Unfinished Migrations: Diaspora - JSTOR

BDSmovement.net | The Palestinian BDS National Committee …

Posted By on November 5, 2015

Since the start of October, Palestinians have been taking part in mass popular resistance against Israeli settler colonialism and apartheid

Head chefs from nine famous restaurants will spend a week cooking in Tel Aviv as part of a PR initiative to bring international prestige to Israels culinary scene. The Round Tables culinary show is sponsored by Israeli government ministries, the Tel Aviv Municipality and businesses operating in illegal Israeli settlements.

Military exports drop from $7.5bn to $5.5bn and industry leaders believe less desire for Israeli-made products is a key factor

Briefing - The case for a comprehensive military embargo on Israel

#SolidarityWaveBDS As a new generation of Palestinians is marching on the footsteps of previous generations, rising up against Israels brutal, decades-old regime of occupation, settler colonialism and apartheid, four Colombian film festivals join the cultural boycott against Israels regime. Local Continuereading

El Comit Nacional Palestino de BDS ha publicado un documento para destacar algunos puntos clave sobre acontecimientos en curso en Palestina

The Palestinian BDS National Committee has published a new resource to highlighting some key points regarding ongoing developments in Palestine

A selection of photos from just a few of the actions that took place over the weekend of October 16-18.

Solidaridad con la resistencia popular palestina!

Tell us about the actions you are planning as part of the International BDS wave of solidarity with Palestinian Popular Resistance

See the original post here:
BDSmovement.net | The Palestinian BDS National Committee ...

Israel: Geography, History, Politics, and More

Posted By on November 4, 2015

State of Israel

President-elect: Reuven Rivlin (2014)

Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu (2009)

Land area: 7,849 sq mi (20,329 sq km); total area: 8,019 sq mi (20,770 sq km)

Population (2014 est.): 7,821,850 (growth rate: 1.46%); birth rate: 18.44/1000; infant mortality rate: 3.98/1000; life expectancy: 81.28

Capital and largest city (2009 est.): Jerusalem, 791,000 Note: Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital in 1950, but the U.S., like nearly all other countries, maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.

Other large cities: Tel Aviv-Yafo 3.381 million; Haifa 1.054 million

Monetary unit: Shekel

National name: Medinat Yisra'el

Current government officials

Languages: Hebrew (official), Arabic, English

Ethnicity/race: Jewish 75.1% (of which Israel-born 73.6%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 17.9%, Africa-born 5.2%, Asia-born 3.2%), non-Jewish 24.9% (mostly Arab) (2012 est.)

Religions: Jewish 75.1%, Muslim 17.4%, Christian 2%, Druze 1.6%, other 3.9% (2012 est.)

National Holiday: Independence Day, April or May 14

Literacy rate: 97% (2004 est.)

Economic summary: GDP/PPP (2014 est.): $273.2 billion; per capita $36,200. Real growth rate: 3.3%. Inflation: 3.9%. Unemployment: 1.7%. Arable land: 13.68%. Agriculture: citrus, vegetables, cotton; beef, poultry, dairy products. Labor force: 3.493 million; agriculture 1.65%; industry 18.1%; services 80.3% (2012). Industries: high-technology projects (including aviation, communications, computer-aided design and manufactures, medical electronics, fiber optics), wood and paper products, potash and phosphates, food, beverages, and tobacco, caustic soda, cement, construction, metals products, chemical products, plastics, diamond cutting, textiles, footwear. Natural resources: timber, potash, copper ore, natural gas, phosphate rock, magnesium bromide, clays, sand. Exports: $62.32 billion (2012 est.): machinery and equipment, software, cut diamonds, agricultural products, chemicals, textiles and apparel. Imports: $67.03 billion (2013 est.): raw materials, military equipment, investment goods, rough diamonds, fuels, grain, consumer goods. Major trading partners: U.S., Belgium, Hong Kong, Germany, Switzerland, UK, China (2006).

Communications: Telephones: main lines in use: 3.594 million (2012); mobile cellular 9.225 million (2012). Broadcast media: state broadcasting network, operated by the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), broadcasts on 2 channels, one in Hebrew and the other in Arabic; 5 commercial channels including a channel broadcasting in Russian, a channel broadcasting Knesset proceedings, and a music channel supervised by a public body; multi-channel satellite and cable TV packages provide access to foreign channels; IBA broadcasts on 8 radio networks with multiple repeaters and Israel Defense Forces Radio broadcasts over multiple stations; about 15 privately owned radio stations; overall more than 100 stations and repeater stations (2008). Internet hosts: 2.483 million (2012). Internet users: 4.525 million (2009).

Transportation: Railways: total: 975 km (2008). Roadways: total: 18,566 km; paved: 18,566 km (including 449 km of expressways) (2011). Ports and terminals: Ashdod, Elat (Eilat), Hadera, Haifa. Airports: 47 (2013).

International disputes: West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; Israel continues construction of a "seam line" separation barrier along parts of the Green Line and within the West Bank; Israel announced its intention to pull out Israeli settlers and withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank in 2005; Golan Heights is Israeli-occupied (Lebanon claims the Shab'a Farms area of Golan Heights); since 1948, about 350 peacekeepers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) headquartered in Jerusalem monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN personnel in the region.

Major sources and definitions

Israel, slightly larger than Massachusetts, lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bordered by Egypt on the west, Syria and Jordan on the east, and Lebanon on the north. Its maritime plain is extremely fertile. The southern Negev region, which comprises almost half the total area, is largely a desert. The Jordan, the only important river, flows from the north through Lake Hule (Waters of Merom) and Lake Kinneret (also called Sea of Galilee or Sea of Tiberias), finally entering the Dead Sea 1,349 ft (411 m) below sea levelthe world's lowest land elevation.

Parliamentary democracy.

Palestine, considered a holy land by Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and homeland of the modern state of Israel, was known as Canaan to the ancient Hebrews. Palestine's name derives from the Philistines, a people who occupied the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C.

A Hebrew kingdom established in 1000 B.C. was later split into the kingdoms of Judah and Israel; they were subsequently invaded by Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, and Alexander the Great of Macedonia. By A.D. 135, few Jews were left in Palestine; most lived in the scattered and tenacious communities of the Diaspora, communities formed outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile. Palestine became a center of Christian pilgrimage after the emperor Constantine converted to that faith. The Arabs took Palestine from the Byzantine empire in 634640. Interrupted only by Christian Crusaders, Muslims ruled Palestine until the 20th century. During World War I, British forces defeated the Turks in Palestine and governed the area under a League of Nations mandate from 1923.

As part of the 19th-century Zionist movement, Jews had begun settling in Palestine as early as 1820. This effort to establish a Jewish homeland received British approval in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. During the 1930s, Jews persecuted by the Hitler regime poured into Palestine. The postwar acknowledgment of the HolocaustHitler's genocide of 6 million Jewsincreased international interest in and sympathy for the cause of Zionism. However, Arabs in Palestine and surrounding countries bitterly opposed prewar and postwar proposals to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish sectors. The British mandate to govern Palestine ended after the war, and, in 1947, the UN voted to partition Palestine. When the British officially withdrew on May 14, 1948, the Jewish National Council proclaimed the State of Israel.

U.S. recognition came within hours. The next day, Arab forces from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the new nation. By the cease-fire on Jan. 7, 1949, Israel had increased its original territory by 50%, taking western Galilee, a broad corridor through central Palestine to Jerusalem, and part of modern Jerusalem. Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion became Israel's first president and prime minister. The new government was admitted to the UN on May 11, 1949.

The next clash with Arab neighbors came when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 and barred Israeli shipping. Coordinating with an Anglo-French force, Israeli troops seized the Gaza Strip and drove through the Sinai to the east bank of the Suez Canal, but withdrew under U.S. and UN pressure. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel made simultaneous air attacks against Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian air bases, totally defeating the Arabs. Expanding its territory by 200%, Israel at the cease-fire held the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, Jerusalem's Old City, and all of the Sinai and the east bank of the Suez Canal.

In the face of Israeli reluctance even to discuss the return of occupied territories, the fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted on Oct. 6, 1973, with a surprise Egyptian and Syrian assault on the Jewish high holy day of Yom Kippur. Initial Arab gains were reversed when a cease-fire took effect two weeks later, but Israel suffered heavy losses.

A dramatic breakthrough in the tortuous history of Mideast peace efforts occurred on Nov. 9, 1977, when Egypt's president Anwar Sadat declared his willingness to talk about reconciliation. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, on Nov. 15, extended an invitation to the Egyptian leader to address the Knesset in Jerusalem. Sadat's arrival in Israel four days later raised worldwide hopes, but an agreement between Egypt and Israel was long in coming. On March 14, 1979, the Knesset approved a final peace treaty, and 12 days later, Begin and Sadat signed the document, together with President Jimmy Carter, in a White House ceremony. Israel began its withdrawal from the Sinai, which it had annexed from Egypt, on May 25.

Although Israel withdrew its last settlers from the Sinai in April 1982, the fragile Mideast peace was shattered on June 9, 1982, by a massive Israeli assault on southern Lebanon, where the Palestinian Liberation Organization was entrenched. The PLO had long plagued Israelis with acts of terrorism. Israel destroyed PLO strongholds in Tyre and Sidon and reached the suburbs of Beirut on June 10. A U.S.-mediated accord between Lebanon and Israel, signed on May 17, 1983, provided for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel eventually withdrew its troops from the Beirut area but kept them in southern Lebanon, where occasional skirmishes would continue. Lebanon, under pressure from Syria, canceled the accord in March 1984.

A continual source of tension has been the relationship between the Jews and the Palestinians living within Israeli territories. Most Arabs fled the region when the state of Israel was declared, but those who remain now make up almost one-fifth of the population of Israel. They are about two-thirds Muslim, as well as Christian and Druze. Palestinians living on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip fomented the riots begun in 1987, known as the intifada. Violence heightened as Israeli police cracked down and Palestinians retaliated. Continuing Jewish settlement of lands designated for Palestinians has added to the unrest.

In 1988, the leader of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, reversed decades of PLO polemic by acknowledging Israel's right to exist. He stated his willingness to enter negotiations to create a Palestinian political entity that would coexist with the Israeli state.

In 1991, Israel was struck by Iraqi missiles during the Persian Gulf War. The Israelis did not retaliate in order to preserve the international coalition against Iraq. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister. He halted the disputed Israeli settlement of the occupied territories.

Highly secretive talks in Norway resulted in the landmark Oslo Accord between the PLO and the Israeli government in 1993. The accord stipulated a five-year plan in which Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would gradually become self-governing. Arafat became president of the new Palestinian Authority. In 1994, Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan; Israel still has no formal agreement with Syria or Lebanon.

On Nov. 4, 1995, Prime Minister Rabin was slain by a Jewish extremist, jeopardizing the tentative progress toward peace. Shimon Peres succeeded him until May 1996 elections for the Knesset gave Israel a new hard-line prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, by a razor-thin margin. Netanyahu reversed or stymied much of the Oslo Accord, contending that it offered too many quick concessions and jeopardized Israelis' safety.

Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in 1997 were repeatedly undermined by both sides. Although the Hebron Accord was signed in January, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron, the construction of new Jewish settlements on the West Bank in March profoundly upset progress toward peace.

Terrorism erupted again in 1997 when radical Hamas suicide bombers claimed the lives of more than 20 Israeli civilians. Netanyahu, accusing Palestinian Authority president Arafat of lax security, retaliated with draconian sanctions against Palestinians working in Israel, including the withholding of millions of dollars in tax revenue, a blatant violation of the Oslo Accord. Netanyahu also persisted in authorizing right-wing Israelis to build new settlements in mostly Arab East Jerusalem. Arafat, meanwhile, seemed unwilling or unable to curb the violence of Arab extremist.

An Oct. 1998 summit at Wye Mills, Md., generated the first real progress in the stymied Middle East peace talks in 19 months, with Netanyahu and Arafat settling several important interim issues called for by the 1993 Oslo Accord. The peace agreement, however, began unraveling almost immediately. By the end of April 1999, Israel had made 41 air raids on Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon. The guerrillas were fighting against Israeli troops and their allies, the South Lebanon Army militia, who occupied a security zone set up in 1985 to guard Israel's borders. Public pressure in Israel to withdraw the troops grew.

Labor Party leader Ehud Barak won the 1999 election and announced that he planned not only to pursue peace with the Palestinians, but to establish relations with Syria and end the low-grade war in southern Lebanon with the Iranian-armed Hezbollah guerrillas. In Dec. 1999, Israeli-Syrian talks resumed after a nearly four-year hiatus. By Jan. 2000, however, talks had broken down over Syria's demand for a detailed discussion of the return of all of the Golan Heights. In Feb., new Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops in southern Lebanon led to Israel's retaliatory bombing as well as Barak's decision to pull out of Lebanon. Israeli troops pulled out of Lebanon on May 24, 2000, after 18 consecutive years of occupation.

Peace talks in July 2000 at Camp David between Barak and Arafat ended unsuccessfully, despite President Clinton's strongest effortsthe status of Jerusalem was the primary sticking point. In September, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon visited the compound called Temple Mount by Jews and Haram al-Sharif by Muslims, a fiercely contested site that is sacred to both faiths. The visit set off the worst bloodshed in years, with the deaths of around 400 people, mostly Palestinians. The violence (dubbed the Al-Aksa intifada) and the stalled peace process fueled growing concerns about Israeli security, paving the way for hard-liner Sharon's stunning landslide victory over Barak in Feb. 2001. Attacks on both sides continued at an alarming rate. Palestinians carried out some of the most horrific suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in years (Hamas and the Al-Aksa Martyr Brigade claimed responsibility for the majority of them), killing Israeli civilians at cafs, bus stops, and supermarkets. In retaliation, Israel unleashed bombing raids on Palestinian territory and sent troops and tanks to occupy West Bank and Gaza cities.

In 2003, in an attempt to restart the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israel and the United States resolved to circumvent Arafat, whom Sharon called irrelevant and an obstacle. Under U.S. pressure, Arafat reluctantly appointed a prime minister in April, who was to replace him in negotiating the peace process, Mahmoud Abbas, formerly Arafat's second-in-command. On May 1, the Quartet (the U.S., UN, EU, and Russia) unfurled the road map for peace, which envisioned the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. Although Sharon publicly acknowledged the need for a Palestinian state and Abbas committed himself to ending Palestinian violence, by fall 2003, it became clear that the road map led to a dead end as Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians continued, and Israel stepped up its targeted killings of Palestinian militants. Sharon also persisted in building the highly controversial security barrier dividing Israeli and Palestinian areas.

In May 2004, the UN Security Council condemned Israel's attack on the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, the largest Israeli military operation in Gaza in decades. In July, in response to a ruling by Israel's supreme court about the construction of the West Bank barrier, Israel revised the route so that it did not cut into Palestinian land. The UN estimated that the original route would have taken almost 15% of West Bank territory for Israel.

Yasir Arafat's death in Nov. 2004 significantly altered the political landscape. Mahmoud Abbas was easily elected the Palestinian president in Jan. 2005, and at a summit in February, Abbas and Sharon agreed to an unequivocal cease-fire. A continued threat to this cease-fire were Palestinian militant groups, over whom Abbas had little control.

On Aug. 15, the withdrawal of some 8,000 Israeli settlers began. The evacuation involved 21 Gaza settlements as well as 4 of the more isolated of the West Bank's 120 settlements. The majority of Israelis supported Prime Minister Ariel Sharons unilateral planwhich he pushed through the Knesset in Oct. 2004viewing it as Israel's just and humane response toward the Palestinians as well as a significant step toward real security for Israelis. But tens of thousands on the right protested that Sharon, an architect of the settlement movement, had become the agent of Gaza's dismantlement.

While Sharon was lauded for what has arguably been the most significant step in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since the Oslo Accord, the prime ministers unstated motives in conceding Gaza were generally assumed to be the strengthening of Israel's hold on the West Bank.

Israel's political parties underwent a seismic shift in late Nov. 2005. The Labor Party elected left-leaning Amir Peretz as their new leader, a defeat for long time leader Shimon Peres. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Sharon quit the Likud Partya party he helped foundand formed the new, more centrist Kadima (Forward) Party. The Likud Party had largely disapproved of the Gaza withdrawal Sharon sponsored, and he faced increasing discontent from the more right-wing members of the Likud Party. Former prime minister and hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu became Likud's new leader.

In Jan. 2006, Ariel Sharon suffered a stroke that left him critically ill and unable to govern. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became acting prime minister, and in general elections on March 28, Olmert's Kadima Party won the largest number of seats. In May, he formed a coalition between the Kadima, Labor, ultra-orthodox Shas, and Pensioners parties.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon died on Jan. 11, 2014. The official cause of death was heart failure, although Sharon had been in a coma since suffering from the stroke in Jan. 2006.

Israeli-Palestinian relations were thrown into further turmoil when the militant Hamas Party won an unexpected landslide victory in the January Palestinian parliamentary elections. Although Hamas had been in a cease-fire with Israel for more than a year the party continued to call for Israel's destruction and refused to renounce violence.

In April 2006, Hamas fired rockets into Israeli territory, effectively ending the cease-fire between them. After Hamas militants killed two Israeli soldiers and kidnapped another on June 25, Israel launched air strikes and sent ground troops into Gaza, destroying its only power plant and three bridges. Fighting continued over the summer, with Hamas firing rockets into Israel, and Israeli troops reoccupying Gaza.

In early July, Israel was involved in war on a second frontwhich was soon to overshadow the fighting in Gazaafter Hezbollah fighters entered Israel and captured two Israeli soldiers. In response, Israel launched a major military attack, bombing the Lebanese airport and other major infrastructures, as well as parts of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah, led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, retaliated by launching hundreds of rockets and missiles into Israel. After a week of fighting, Israel made it clear that its offensive in Lebanon would continue until Hezbollah was routed. Although much of the international community demanded a cease-fire, the United States supported Israel's plan to continue the fighting until Hezbollah was drained of its military power. Hezbollah was thought to have at least 12,000 rockets and missiles, most supplied by Iran, and proved a much more formidable foe than Israel anticipated.

An Israeli opinion poll after the first two weeks of fighting indicated that 81% of Israelis supported the continued attack on Lebanon, and 58% wanted the offensive to continue until Hezbollah was destroyed. The UN brokered a tenuous cease-fire on August 14. About 1,150 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 150 Israelis, the majority of them soldiers, died in the 34 days of fighting.

A commission that investigated 2006's war between Israel and Lebanon released a scathing report in April 2007, saying Prime Minister Olmert was responsible for "a severe failure in exercising judgment, responsibility, and prudence." It also said that Olmert rushed to war without an adequate plan. Defense Minister Amir Peretz and former army chief Dan Halutz were also rebuked in the report. Olmert resisted calls for his resignation and survived a no-confidence vote in parliament.

Former prime minister Ehud Barak returned to politics in June, having been elected head of the Labor Party. He defeated Knesset member Ami Ayalon. In addition, Shimon Peres, of the Kadima Party, was elected president in June. The presidency is a mostly ceremonial post.

Israeli jets fired on targets deep inside Syria in Sept. 2007. American and Israeli intelligence analysts later said that Israel had attacked a partially built nuclear reactor. Several officials wondered aloud if North Korea had played a role in the development of the nuclear plant. Syria denied that any such facilities exist and protested to the United Nations, calling the attack a "violation of sovereignty."

At a Middle East peace conference in November hosted by the U.S. in Annapolis, Md., Olmert and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas agreed to work together to broker a peace treaty. "We agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements, a joint statement said. We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. Officials from 49 countries attended the conference.

In Jan. 2008, the Winograd Commission released its final report on Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It called the operation a "large and serious" failure and criticized the country's leadership for failing to have an exit strategy in place before the invasion began. Prime Minister Olmert was spared somewhat, as the commission said that in ordering the invasion, he was acting in "the interest of the state of Israel."

Prime Minister Olmert faced legal difficultiesagain beginning in May 2008, when he faced accusations that he accepted hundreds of thousands dollars in bribes from a New York businessman. Olmert said the funds were campaign contributions. The businessman, Morris Talansky, testified in May that he gave Olmert about $150,000, mostly in cash, over 13 years. Talansky said the money was for election campaigns and personal expenses and did not expect Olmert to reciprocate in any way. Olmert has faced similar investigations in the past but deftly survived the scandals.

For the first time in eight years, Israel and Syria returned to the bargaining table in May 2008. Israel hopes an agreement will distance Iran from Syria and diminish some sway Iran holds over the Middle East, and Syria wants to regain control over the Golan Heights, which was taken by Israel in 1967.

After years of almost daily exchanges of rocket fire between Israelis and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Israel and Hamas, the militant group that controls Gaza, signed an Egyptian-brokered cease-fire in June. The fragile agreement held for most of the remainder of 2008. Israel continued its yearlong blockade of Gaza, however, and the humanitarian and economic crisis in Gaza intensified.

Olmert resigned in September, as expected, after Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was elected head of Kadima, the main party in the governing coalition. She was not able to form a new majority coalition, however.

While Palestinian and Israeli officials continued their dialogue throughout 2008, a final peace deal remained out of reach amid the growing rift between Fatah, which controls the West Bank, and Hamas. In addition, Israel's continued development of settlements in the occupied West Bank further stalled the process. In late December 2008, days after the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas expired, Hamas began launching rocket attacks into Israel, which retaliated with airstrikes that killed about 300 people. Israel targeted Hamas bases, training camps, and missile storage facilities. Egypt sealed its border with Gaza, angering Palestinians who were attempting to flee the attacks and seeking medical attention. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the goal of the operation was not intended to reoccupy Gaza, but to restore normal life and quiet to residents of the south of Israel.

After more than a week of intense airstrikes, Israeli troops crossed the border into Gaza, launching a ground war against Hamas. Israeli aircraft continued to attack suspected Hamas fighters, weapons stockpiles, rocket-firing positions, and smuggling tunnels. After several weeks of fighting, more than 1,300 Gazans and about a dozen Israelis had been killed.

In September, Richard Goldstone, a South African jurist, released a UN-backed report on the conflict in Gaza. The report accused both the Israeli military and Palestinian fighters of war crimes, alleging that both had targeted civilians. Goldstone, however, reserved much of his criticism for Israel, saying its incursion was a "deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate, and terrorize a civilian population." Israel denounced the report as "deeply flawed, one-sided and prejudiced." The United States also said it was "unbalanced and biased," and the U.S. House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution that called the report "irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy."

Goldstone recommended that both Israel and the Palestinians launch independent investigations into the conflict. If they refused, Goldstone recommended that the Security Council then refer both to the International Criminal Court. The UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution in October that endorsed the report and its recommendation regarding the investigations. In November, the UN General Assembly passed a similar resolution. Both Israel and the U.S. said continued action on the report could further derail the peace process.

Parliamentary elections in Feb. 2009 produced inconclusive results. The centrist Kadima party, led by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, won 28 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, the most of any party. Netanyahu's right-wing Likud took 27. The Labor Party fared poorly, garnering only 13 seats, behind the far-right party, Yisrael Beitenu, which took 15. Netanyahu, who became prime minister in April, formed a coalition government with Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Avigdor Lieberman, who was named foreign minister, and the Labor Party led by Barak, who became defense minister.

As a gesture of good will, compromise, and a fresh attempt at peace talks between Israel and Palestine, U.S. vice president Joe Biden traveled to Israel in March 2010 to begin indirect negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Soon after Biden arrived, however, it was announced that 1,600 houses would be built for Jewish settlers on the Eastern tip of Jerusalem, a section of the city Palestinians saw as part of their future capital. Biden immediately condemned the plan. Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized for the timing, but refused to rescind the decision.

Just two weeks later, Netanyahu traveled to the United States to meet with President Barack Obama; their encounter was unusually secretive and specific discussions were not widely released. Obama was reportedly trying to force Netanyahu into making concessions, specifically to freeze the Jewish settlement-building plan in East Jerusalem. Obama insisted that Jerusalem and other larger issues of contention between Israel and Palestine be discussed in "proximity talks" and that eventual negotiations would have to include steps to build Palestinian confidence, such as releasing Palestinian prisoners and dismantling Israeli military road blocks. Netanyahu complained that his allies would rebel against him if such steps were promised. Obama emphasized that the two countries would have to resolve their issues themselves; the U.S. could only help in the discussion, not solve their problems for them.

In late May 2010, an activist group, Free Gaza Now, and a Turkish humanitarian organization, Insani Yardim Vakfi, sent a flotilla of aid to Gaza, a violation of a blockade that Israel and Egypt imposed on Gaza in 2007. The move was an apparent attempt to further politicize the blockade. In the early hours of May 31, Israeli commandos boarded one of the ships, and there are conflicting accounts of what happened next. The Israelis say the commandos were attacked with clubs, rods, and knives, and that they fired upon the activists in retaliation; the activists say the commandos opened fire when they landed on deck. Nine activists were killed in the conflict. Israel's use of force on civilians was widely criticized as provocative and prompted leaders throughout the world to question the effectiveness of the blockade it has thus far failed to weaken Hamas but has had a punitive effect on the citizens of Gaza. Israel did in fact ease the blockade in June, allowing building materials and other essentials goods to be brought into Gaza.

Direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians resumed in September 2010. They hit a potentially deal-breaking snag early in the talks when Netanyahu allowed the 10-month moratorium on settlement construction to expire, and bulldozers were put to work almost immediately. Abbas, however, kept hopes for peace alive by saying he'd consult with other members of the Arab League before walking away from the table. Weeks passed with no progress, and as the impasse dragged on, the U.S. stepped in and offered to sell Israel 20 F-35 stealth airplanes and veto any anti-Israel resolutions put to a vote at the UN in exchange for a 90-day extension of the freeze. Netanyahu seemed open to the compromise, but failed to get the backing of his cabinet. The U.S. abandoned its pursuit of a deal in December, when it became clear that little would be accomplished in 90 days even if the deal were reached. At the same time, the U.S. declared that this round of negotiations had ended in failure.

In Jan. 2011, Ehud Barak, Israel's minister of defense and Labor party leader, quit his party to set up a new party called Independence. Four other members of parliament left with him. The remaining eight Labor party members moved to the opposition, shrinking Netanyahu's coalition from 74 seats to 66 in the 120-seat parliament. Netanyahu insisted that the shift made his coalition stronger because members became more ideologically aligned. However, the opposition became stronger, too, which may be a sign that peace negotiations with the Palestinians can be revived.

On May 19, 2011, attempting to capitalize on the season of change in the Arab world, President Obama declared that the borders demarcated before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war should be the basis of a Mideast peace deal between Israel and Palestine. He also said that the borders should be adjusted to account for Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Obama's speech came a day before a scheduled meeting with Netanyahu in Washington. The Israeli government protested immediately, saying that a return to the pre-1967 borders would leave Israel "indefensible," which Netanyahu reiterate during his meeting with Obama. However, Netanyahu maintained that Israel is open to negotiations.

On July 30, 2011, 150,000 people protested in streets across the country, including in Jerusalem. It was one of the largest demonstrations in Israel's history and the biggest protest ever over economic and social issues. Protests started earlier in the month over rising housing costs, organized largely by a Facebook-driven campaign by young people, much like the social media campaigns that aided change in Egypt and other nations in the region. With much of the region knee-deep in political unrests, and no peace plan with Palestine in sight, protestors have grown tired of setting aside domestic issues for the sake of the nation's security. While increasing housing costs were a catalyst, protestors were also reacting to a growing sense of frustration over the fact that the country's soaring wealth remains in the hands of a few people, while the average Israeli struggles to cover basic expenses.

On July 31, 2011, the director general of the finance minister resigned over the protests. Although none of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition parties have pulled out, the protests could have an impact on the government, particularly in reviving the defeated left. Left wing parties could swing the power back in their direction with the public focused on social issues rather than settlements in the West Bank and a two-state solution with Palestine. Those latter two issues still put the left wing at odds with the majority in Israel.

As protests continued throughout August 2011, Israel announced a plan to build a 1,600-unit apartment complex in Ramat Shlomo, an area of East Jerusalem. The Interior Ministry also said that it would soon approve another 2,700 housing units in Ramat Shlomo, part of the area that Israel annexed after capturing it from Jordan. The announcement threatened the United States effort to renew the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The new housing plans angered the Palestinians and came a month before the Palestinian Authority was scheduled to go before the United Nations General Assembly to declare statehood. Israeli groups opposed to housing construction on land conquered in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War were also angered. These opposition groups accused the Israeli government of exploiting the country's housing shortage, which has led to high rent costs and recent mass protests.

Tensions flared between Israel and Egypt in August 2011, when militants attacked the Israeli resort town of Eilat, on the Egypt-Israel border. Eight Israelis were killed and 30 were wounded. Six Egyptian border guards were also killed in the shootings. Israeli authorities blamed the attacks on the Popular Resistance Committees, a group that has worked with Hamas and said they believed the attackers crossed into Israel from Egypt. Egypt in turn blamed Israel for the deaths. Israel responded with several airstrikes on Gaza, killing the Popular Resistance Committee's commander, among others. Egyptian officials denied that the attackers crossed through. Hamas also denied Israel's accusations.

The cross-border attacks threatened the decades of peace between Israel and Egypt. Meanwhile, Palestinian militants fired several rockets into Israel from Gaza, killing one civilian and wounding six others. Hamas, which controls Gaza, took credit for the rockets fired into Israel.

In Sept. 2011, thousands of protestors attacked the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, demolishing a protective wall while Egyptian security forces watched. Two dozen protestors broke into the offices and threw documents into the street. The Israeli flag was ripped down. When riot police attempted to stop the attack, protesters fought back with Molotov cocktails and stones. At least two protestors died in the attack and at least 1,200 were injured. The attack in Egypt came just one week after Turkey expels Israel's ambassador.

On Sept. 23, 2011, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas officially requested a bid for statehood at the UN Security Council. The request came after months of failed European and U.S. efforts to bring Israel and Palestine back to the negotiating table. The Palestinian Authority requested a Security Council vote to gain statehood as a full member of the UN rather than going to the General Assembly. One of the reasons for this was that the General Assembly could only give the Palestinian Authority non-member observer status at the UN, a lesser degree of statehood. In addition, the European states in the General Assembly made it clear that they would support the proposal if the Palestinians dropped their demand that Israel halt settlement construction. The Palestinians have long insisted that Israel cease the settlement construction and deemed the condition unacceptable. Therefore, the Palestinian Authority preferred to take its case to the Security Council even though the U.S. has vowed to veto the request.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at the United Nation's General Assembly hours after Abbas filed the bid for statehood. Netanyahu disagreed with the Palestinian's proposal for statehood through the UN, urging Abbas to return to negotiating directly with Israel instead. "The truth is the Palestinians want a state without peace," he said.

The following year, on Nov. 29, 2012, the United Nations General Assembly approved an upgrade from the Palestinian Authority's current observer status to that of a non-member state. The vote came after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas spoke to the General Assembly and asked for a "birth certificate" for his country. Of the 193 nations in the General Assembly, 138 voted in favor of the upgrade in status. While the vote was a victory for Palestine, it was a diplomatic setback for the U.S. and Israel. Having the title of "non-member observer state" would allow Palestine access to international organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). If it joined the ICC, Palestine could file complaints of war crimes against Israel.

In response to the UN vote, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would not transfer about $100 million in much-needed tax revenue owed to the struggling Palestinian Authority and would resume plans to build 3,000-unit settlement in an area that divides the north and the south parts of the West Bank, thereby denying the Palestinians any chance for having a contiguous state.

In Dec. 2012, Israel defied growing opposition from the international community by forging ahead with the building of new settlements. Israel's Housing Ministry approved various new settlements throughout the last month of 2012. Construction on them began immediately. With the exception of the United States, every member of the UN Security Council condemned the construction, concerned that the move threatened the peace process with Palestine.

On Oct. 18, 2011, Gilad Shalit, a 25-year-old Israeli soldier, was released after being held for more than five years by Hamas, a militant Palestinian group. In a deal brokered by Egypt, Shalit was exchanged for 1,000 jailed Palestinians, some of whom were convicted planners or perpetrators of deadly terrorist attacks. After the swap, Hamas called for its members to capture more Israel soldiers to exchange them for the remaining 5,000 Palestinian prisoners being held in Israeli jails.

Still many saw the exchange as a sign of hope. Shalit's release had become a national obsession in Israel. He had been held in Gaza since Palestinian militants kidnapped him during a cross-border raid in 2006. In a televised address following Shalit's release, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, "Today we are all united in joy and in pain." Shalit was the first captured Israeli soldier to be returned home alive in 26 years.

In Jan. 2012, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Jordan. Seen as an effort to try to revive peace talks, it was the first time the two sides had met in over a year. On Jan. 25, 2012, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said that the discussions had ended without any significant progress.

Also in Jan., Iran blamed Israel and the United States for the death of Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a nuclear scientist. A bomber on a motorcycle killed Roshan in Tehran during the morning commute, according to Iranian media. It was the fourth attack on an Iranian nuclear specialist in two years. Immediately following the attack, Iran accused the U.S. and Israel. The United States responded by denying any responsibility and condemning the attack. Tension between Israel and Iran intensified in Febrary, when Israeli officials accused Iran of being involved in multiple attacks against Israelis in Georgia and India.

In a speech on May 6, 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for early elections. The speech was in response to unrest among his coalition as well as his opponents. The official reason for early elections was the upcoming expiration of the Tal Law, which exempts ultra-Orthodox Jews from Israeli Army service. However, some election analysts believed that Netanyahu wanted to act swiftly while his Likud Party was polling strongly.

Two days after the call for early elections, Netanyahu formed a unity government with Shaul Mofaz, the newly elected chief of Kadima, the opposition party. The new coalition gave Netanyahu a very large legislative majority and ended the need for early elections. Mofaz was made deputy prime minister under the terms of the agreement. Some saw the new coalition as a way for Netanyahu to gain even more political power. Former Kadima chief, Tzipi Livni, joined a protest against the alliance. A week earlier, after losing her position as both leader of the opposition and chief of the Kadima Party, Livni resigned from Parliament, saying she was not "willing to sell the country to the ultra-Orthodox in order to form a government."

The new unity coalition turned out to be short-lived. In July 2012, Kadima left the coalition. Kadima chief Mofaz said his party pulled out due to irreconcilable differences with Netanyahu over the pending universal draft law.

In Aug. 2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that while economic sanctions have hurt Iran, they have not slowed progress on the country's nuclear program. In fact, the report found that Iran's nuclear program had progressed even faster than anticipated. The report validated Netanyahu's suspicion that Iran's nuclear program has continued to move at full speed despite the sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed on Iran by an international community. The agency's report also confirmed that three-quarters of nuclear centrifuges needed for an underground site had been installed.

The report brought out the differences between Israel and the United States on the issue of how to deal with Iran. The main disagreement between the two countries has been how much time it would take Iran to complete its production of nuclear weapons. Even within Israel there were signs of disagreement. On Sept. 27, 2012, Netanyahu spoke about the issue at the United Nations. "The relevant question is not when Iran will get the bomb. It is at what stage can we stop Iran from getting the bomb," he said. A few days later, Netanyahu calmed fears that a preemptive attack was imminent in an address to the UN General Assembly. He said he believed Iran would not have the technology to enrich uranium until at least the spring of 2013 and therefore there was time for diplomacy to deter Iran's nuclear program.

On Oct. 9, 2012, Netanyahu once again called for early parliamentary election, saying the lack of cooperation with his coalition partners made it impossible to pass a budget with severe cuts. He ordered them for January 2013, eight months ahead of schedule. He said the nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu Party would run with his conservative Likud Party on a joint ticket. Netanyahu's political rivals warned that the alliance of Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu was exactly the kind of extremism that Israel didn't need.

On Nov. 14, 2012, Israel launched one of its biggest attacks on Gaza since the invasion four years ago and hit at least 20 targets. One of those targets was Hamas military commander, Ahmed al-Jabari. He was killed while traveling through Gaza in a car. Al-Jabari was the most senior official killed by the Israelis since its invasion in 2008. The airstrikes were in response to recent repeated rocket attacks by Palestinian militants located in Gaza.

By Nov. 16, 2012, according to officials in Gaza, 19 people had been killed from the Israeli airstrikes. Hesham Qandil, Egypt's prime minister, showed his country's support by visiting Gaza. However, his presence did not stop the fighting. Heavy rocket fire continued from Gaza while the Israeli military called in 16,000 army reservists. For the second time since 2008, Israel prepared for a potential ground invasion.

Throughout mid-Nov. 2012, Israel continued to target members of Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza while Hamas launched several hundred rockets, some hitting Tel Aviv. Egypt, while a staunch supporter of Hamas, attempted to broker a peace agreement between Hamas and Israel to prevent the conflict from further destabilizing the region. Finally on November 21, Egypt's foreign minister Mohamed Kamel Amr, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that a cease-fire had been signed. Both sides agreed to end hostilities toward each other and Israel said it would open Gaza border crossings, allowing the flow of products and people into Gaza, potentially lifting the 5-year blockade that has caused much hardship to those living in the region.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to a third term in January 2013, but the election was not the expected landslide. Netanyahu's Likud-Beiteinu won 31 seats, followed by Yair Lapid's centrist Yesh Atid party, with 19 seats. Tzipi Livni's newly formed Hatnua (the Movement) party won six seats, as did Meretz, a pro-peace party. Netanyahu formed a coalition with Yesh Atid, Hatnua, and the Jewish Home party, which supports settlement building. He appointed Livni as justice minister and asked her to lead Israel's peace talks with Palestine. Lapid was named finance minister.

In mid-March 2013, President Obama visited Israel. During the visit, he helped negotiate a reconciliation between Israel and Turkey. Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed sincere regret to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister, for the commando raid in 2010 on a Turkish ship that killed nine people. Israel also offered compensation for the incident. Erdogan accepted Israel's apology. After the apology, both countries announced that they would reinstate ambassadors and completely restore diplomatic relations.

In early May 2013, Israel ordered two airstrikes on Damascus. The first happened on May 3, and the second two days later. Israeli officials maintained that the airstrikes were not meant as a way for Israel to become involved in Syria's ongoing civil war. Instead, the strikes focused on military warehouses in an effort to prevent Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite militia group with strong ties to Iran, from getting more weapons.

On Aug. 14, 2013, Israelis and Palestinians began peace talks in Jerusalem. Expectations were low going into the talks, the third attempt to negotiate since 2000, and nearly five years since the last attempt. The talks began just hours after Israel released 26 Palestinian prisoners. The prisoner release was an attempt on Israel's part to bring Palestine back to the negotiating table. Israel said the prisoner release would be the first of four. Palestinian officials expressed concern about Israel's ongoing settlement building in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, land that would be part of an official Palestinian state.

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Israel: Geography, History, Politics, and More

Rewriting Israel’s History :: Middle East Quarterly

Posted By on November 4, 2015

Efraim Karsh is director of the Mediterranean Studies Programme at King's College, University of London, and editor of the quarterly journal Israel Affairs.

One of the reasons I gave up political history was that it is very difficult not to direct it towards the future, towards your idea of what ought to happen. And that somehow distorts your view of what has happened.

Albert Hourani

As Israel edges toward peace with the Palestinians, old, highly controversial, and seemingly defunct issues are back on the table, such as the legal status of Jerusalem and the question of the Palestinian refugees. The refugees and their present rights inspire two very different approaches. The Israeli view, based on an assessment of the 1947-49 period that ascribes primary responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy to an extremist and short-sighted leadership, sees Palestinian wounds as primarily self-inflicted and so not in need of compensation. In contrast, Palestinian spokesmen justify their "right of return" to the territory that is now part of the State of Israel (or an alternative compensation) by presenting themselves as victims of Jewish aggression in the late 1940s.

Ironically, it is a group of Israelis who have given the Palestinian argument its intellectual firepower. Starting in 1987, an array of self-styled "new historians" has sought to debunk what it claims is a distorted "Zionist narrative." How valid is this sustained assault on the received version of Israel's early history? This question has real political importance, for the answer is bound to affect the course of Israeli-Palestinian efforts at making peace.

THE NEW HISTORIANS AND THEIR CRITICS

Simha Flapan, the left-wing political activist and editor of New Outlook who inaugurated the assault on alleged "Zionist myths," made no bones about his political motivations in rewriting Israeli history, presenting his book as an attempt to "undermine the propaganda structures that have so long obstructed the growth of the peace forces in my country."1 But soon after, a group of Israeli academics and journalists gave this approach a scholarly imprimatur, calling it the "new history."2 Its foremost spokesmen include Avi Shlaim of Oxford University, Benny Morris of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Ilan Papp of Haifa University. Other prominent adherents include Tom Segev of the Ha'aretz newspaper, Benjamin Beit Hallahmi of Haifa University, and researchers Uri Milstein and Yosi Amitai.

Above all, the new history signifies a set of beliefs: that Zionism was at best an aggressive and expansionist national movement and at worst an offshoot of European imperialism;3 and that it was responsible for the Palestinian tragedy, the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, and even the Middle East's violent history.

In an attempt to prove that the Jewish State was born in sin, the new historians concentrate on the war of 1947-49 (in Israeli parlance, the War of Independence). Deriding alternative interpretations as "old" or "mobilized," they dismiss the notion of a hostile Arab world's seeking to destroy the Jewish state at birth as but a Zionist myth. They insist that when the Jewish Agency accepted the U.N. Resolution of November 1947 (partitioning Mandatory Palestine into Arab and Jewish states), it was less than sincere.

It is obviously a major service to all concerned to take a hard look at the past and, without political intent, to debunk old myths. Is that what the new historians have done? I shall argue that, quite the contrary, they fashion their research to suit contemporary political agendas; worse, they systematically distort the archival evidence to invent an Israeli history in an image of their own making. These are strong words; the following pages shall establish their accuracy.

A number of scholars have already done outstanding work showing the faults of the new history. Itamar Rabinovich (of Tel Aviv University, currently Israel's ambassador to the United States) has debunked the claim by Shlaim and Papp that Israel's recalcitrance explains the failure to make peace at the end of the 1947-49 war.4 Avraham Sela (of the Hebrew University) has discredited Shlaim's allegation that Israel and Transjordan agreed in advance of that war to limit their war operations so as to avoid an all-out confrontation between their forces.5 Shabtai Teveth (David Ben-Gurion's foremost biographer) has challenged Morris's account of the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem.6 Robert Satloff (of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) has shown, on the basis of his own research in the Jordanian national archives in Amman, the existence of hundreds of relevant government files readily available to foreign scholars,7 thereby demolishing the new historians' claim that "the archives of the Arab Governments are closed to researchers, and that historians interested in writing about the Israeli-Arab conflict perforce must rely mainly on Israeli and Western archives"8 -- and with it, the justification for their almost exclusive reliance on Israeli and Western sources.

This article addresses a different question. The previous critics have looked mostly at issues of politics or sources; we shall concentrate on the accuracy of documentation by these self-styled champions of truth and morality. By looking at three central theses of the new historians, our research reveals a completely different picture from the one that new historians themselves have painted. But first, let us examine whether the alleged newness of this self-styled group is justified.

NEW FACTS?

The new historians claim to provide factual revelations about the origins of the Israeli-Arab conflict. According to Shlaim, "the new historiography is written with access to the official Israeli and Western documents, whereas the earlier writers had no access, or only partial access, to the official documents."9

The earlier writers may not have had access to an abundance of newly declassified documents, which became available in the 1980s, but recent "old historians," such as Rabinovich and Sela, have made no less use of them than their "new" counterparts, and they came up with very different conclusions. Which leads to the self-evident realization that it is not the availability of new documents that distinguishes the new historians from their opponents but the interpretation they give to this source material.

Further, much of the fresh information claimed by the new historians turns out to be old indeed. Consider Shlaim's major thesis about secret contacts between the Zionist movement and King `Abdallah of Transjordan. He claims that "it is striking to observe how great is the contrast between accounts of this period written without access to the official documents and an account such as this one, based on documentary evidence."10 Quite the contrary, it is striking to see how little our understanding has changed following the release of state documents. Shlaim himself concedes that the information "that there was traffic between these two parties has been widely known for some time and the two meetings between Golda Meir [acting head of the Jewish Agency's political department] and King `Abdullah in November 1947, and May 1948 have even been featured in popular films."11 Indeed, not only was the general gist of the `Abdallah-Meir conversations common knowledge by 1960,12 but most of the early writers had access to then-classified official documents. Dan Kurzman's 1970 account of that meeting is a near verbatim narration of the report prepared by the Jewish Agency's political department adviser on Arab affairs, Ezra Danin.13 Shlaim also relies on Danin's report, adding nothing new to Kurzman's revelations.

Much of the fresh information claimed by the new historians turns out to be old indeed. . . .

. . . As for new interpretations, some are indeed new, but only because they are flat wrong.

Similarly, Shlaim places great stress on a February 1948 meeting between the prime minister of Transjordan, Tawfiq Abu'l-Huda, and the foreign secretary of Great Britain, Ernest Bevin, claiming the latter at that time blessed an alleged Hashemite-Jewish agreement to divide Palestine. But this meeting was already known in 1957, when Sir John Bagot Glubb, the former commander of the Arab Legion, wrote his memoirs,14 and most early works on the Arab-Israeli conflict used this information.15

Morris's foremost self-laudatory "revelation" concerns the expulsion of Arabs from certain places by Israeli forces, at times through the use of violence. This was made known decades earlier in such works as Jon and David Kimche's Both Sides of the Hill; Rony Gabbay's A Political Study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; and Nadav Safran's From War to War.16

Eager to debunk the perception of the 1947-49 war as a heroic struggle of the few against the many, the new historians have pointed to an approximate numerical parity on the battlefield.17 Yet this too was well known: school-children could find it in historical atlases, university students in academic books.18 Ben-Gurion's autobiographical account of Israel's history, published nearly two decades before the new historians made their debut on the public stage, contains illuminating data on the Arab-Israeli military balance; his edited war diaries, published by the Ministry of Defense Press in 1983, give a detailed breakdown of the Israeli order of battle: no attempt at a cover-up here.19

NEW INTERPRETATIONS?

As for new interpretations, some are indeed new, but only because they are flat wrong. Ilan Papp has gone so far as to argue that the outcome of the 1947-49 war had been predetermined in the political and diplomatic corridors of power "long before even one shot had been fired."20 To which, one can only say that the State of Israel paid a high price indeed to effect this predetermined outcome: the war's six thousand fatalities represented 1 percent of Israel's total Jewish population, a higher human toll than that suffered by Great Britain in World War II.21 Further, Israel's battlefield losses during the war were about the same as those of the Palestinians; and given that its population was roughly half the latter's size, Israel lost proportionately twice the percentage of the Palestinians.22

Other interpretations ring truer, but only because they are old and familiar. Shlaim concedes that his charge of Jordanian-Israeli collusion is not a new one but was made decades before him.23 In fact, this conspiracy theory has been quite pervasive. In Arab historiography of an anti-Hashemite caste, "the collusion myth became the crux of an historical indictment against the king for betraying the Arab national cause in Palestine."24 On the Israeli side, both left- and right-wingers have levelled this same criticism at the government's conduct of the 1947-49 war. Shlaim has hardly broken new ground.

Shlaim's main claim to novelty lies in his challenging "the conventional view of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a simple bipolar affair in which a monolithic and implacably hostile Arab world is pitted against the Jews."25 But this "conventional view" does not exist. Even such passionately pro-Israel feature films on the 1947-49 war as Exodus and Cast a Giant Shadow do not portray "a monolithic and implacably hostile Arab world pitted against the Jews," but show divided Arab communities in which some leaders would rather not fight the Jews and others would cooperate with the Jews against their Arab "brothers." And what applies to popular movies applies all the more to scholarly writings. Not one of the studies by the "old historians" subscribes to the stereotypical approach attached to them by Shlaim.

The same applies to Morris. His claim that "what happened in Palestine/Israel over 1947-9 was so complex and varied . . . that a single-cause explanation of the exodus from most sites is untenable"26 echoes not only Aharon Cohen's and Rony Gabbay's conclusions of thirty years earlier27 but also the standard explanation of the Palestinian exodus by such "official Zionist" writers as Joseph Schechtman: "This mass flight of the Palestinian Arabs is a phenomenon for which no single explanation suffices. Behind it lies a complex of apparently contradictory factors."28

Even the claim to novelty is not new! Aharon Klieman, the quintessential "old historian," wrote in his study of Hashemite-Zionist relations, published just two years before Shlaim's book, that "it has been a commonplace to present the Palestine or the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its historical stages as a simple bilateral conflict. . . . It is a mistake to present the Arab side to the equation as a monolithic bloc. The `Arab camp' has always been divided and at war with itself."29

At times, the new historians themselves realize they are recycling old ideas. For example, Shlaim acknowledged that their arguments were foreshadowed by such writers as Gabbay, Israel Baer, Gabriel Cohen, and Meir Pail.30 In all, the new historians have neither ventured to territory unknown to earlier generations of scholars, nor made major factual discoveries, nor provided truly original interpretations, let alone developed novel historical methodologies or approaches. They have used precisely the same research methods and source-material as those whose work they disdain -- the only difference between these two groups being the interpretation given to their findings. Let us now turn to the accuracy of those interpretations.

I. PUSHING OUT THE ARABS

The new historians make three main claims about the Zionist movement in the late 1940s: it secretly intended to expel the Palestinians, it conspired with King `Abdallah to dispossess the Palestinians of their patrimony, and it won British support for this joint effort. Are these accusations accurate?

Morris writes that "from the mid-1930s most of the Yishuv's leaders, including Ben-Gurion, wanted to establish a Jewish state without an Arab minority, or with as small an Arab minority as possible, and supported a `transfer solution' to this minority problem."31 He argues that the transfer idea "had a basis in mainstream Jewish thinking, if not actual planning, from the late 1930s and 1940s."32 But Morris, the new historian who has made the greatest effort to prove this thesis, devotes a mere five pages to this subject. He fails to prove his claim.

First, the lion's share of his "evidence" comes from a mere three meetings of the Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) during June 7-12, 1938. Five days in the life of a national movement can scarcely provide proof of longstanding trends or ideologies, especially since these meetings were called to respond to specific ad hoc issues. Moreover, Morris has painted a totally false picture of the actual proceedings of these meetings. Contrary to his claim that the meetings "debated at length various aspects of the transfer idea,"33 the issue was discussed only in the last meeting, and even then as but one element in the overall balance of risks and opportunities attending Britain's suggested partition rather than as a concrete policy option. The other two meetings did not discuss the subject at all.34

Secondly, Morris virtually ignores that the idea of transfer was forced on the Zionist agenda by the British (in the recommendations of the 1937 Peel Royal Commission on Palestine) rather than being self-generated.35 He downplays the commission's recommendation of transfer, creates the false impression that the Zionists thrust this idea on a reluctant British Mandatory power (rather than vice versa), and misleadingly suggests that Zionist interest in transfer long outlived the Peel Commission.36

Thirdly, and most important, Morris systematically falsifies evidence, to the point that there is scarcely a single document he relies on without twisting and misleading, either by a creative rewriting of the original text, by taking words out of context, or by truncating texts and thereby distorting their meaning. For example, Morris finds an alleged Zionist interest in the idea of transfer lasting up to the outbreak of the 1948 war. Yes, Morris concedes, Ben-Gurion in a July 1947 testimony to the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) "went out of his way to reject the 1945 British Labour Party platform `International Post-war Settlement' which supported the encouragement of the movement of the Palestine Arabs to the neighboring countries to make room for Jews."37 But he insinuates that Ben-Gurion was insincere; in his heart of hearts, he subscribed to the transfer idea at the beginning of the 1947-49 war. Becoming a mind-reader, Morris discerns the transfer in a Ben-Gurion speech in December 1947:

There was no explicit mention of the collective transfer idea.

However, there was perhaps a hint of the idea in Ben-Gurion's speech to Mapai's supporters four days after the UN Partition resolution, just as Arab-Jewish hostilities were getting under way. Ben-Gurion starkly outlined the emergent Jewish State's main problem -- its prospective population of 520,000 Jews and 350,000 Arabs. Including Jerusalem, the state would have a population of about one million, 40% of which would be non-Jews. "This fact must be viewed in all its clarity and sharpness. With such a [population] composition, there cannot even be complete certainty that the government will be held by a Jewish majority. . . . There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%." The Yishuv's situation and fate, he went on, compelled the adoption of "a new approach . . . new habits of mind" to "suit our new future. We must think like a state."38

Morris creates the impression here that Ben-Gurion believed only transfer would resolve the problem of a substantial Arab minority in the Jewish State.

Is this mind-reading of Ben-Gurion correct? Was there really a hint of the transfer idea in his speech? Here is the text from which Morris draws his citation:

We have been confronted with a new destiny -- we are about to become masters of our own fate. This requires a new approach to all our questions of life. We must reexamine all our habits of mind, all our systems of operation to see to what extent they suit our new future. We must think in terms of a state, in terms of independence, in terms of full responsibility for ourselves -- and for others.39

This original text suggests that Morris has distorted the evidence in three ways.

First, Morris omits Ben-Gurion's statement that there can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as the Jewish majority "consists of only 600,000 Jews." He distorts Ben-Gurion's intention by narrowing the picture to a preoccupation with the 60-40 percent ratio, when its real scope was a concern about the absolute size of the Jewish population.

Secondly, Morris creates the impression that Ben-Gurion's call for a "new approach . . . new habits of mind" applied to the Arab minority problem, implicitly referring to transfer. In fact, it applied to the challenges attending the transition from a community under colonial domination to national self-determination.

Thirdly, he omits Ben-Gurion's statement on the need to take "full responsibility for ourselves -- and for others." Who are these others but the non-Jewish minority of the Jewish State?

Worse, Morris chooses to rely on a secondary source rather than consult the primary document; and for good reason, for an examination of the original would easily dispel the cloud of innuendo with which Morris surrounded Ben-Gurion's speech:

. . . There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60 percent, and so long as this majority consists of only 600,000 Jews.

From here stems the first and principal conclusion. The creation of the state is not the formal implementation process discussed by the UN General Assembly. . . . To ensure not only the establishment of the Jewish State but its existence and destiny as well -- we must bring a million-and-a-half Jews to the country and root them there. It is only when there will be at least two millions Jews in the country -- that the state will be truly established.40

This speech contains not a hint of the transfer idea. Ben-Gurion's long-term solution to the 60-40 percent ratio between the Jewish majority and non-Jewish minority is clear and unequivocal: mass Jewish immigration.

As for the position of the Arabs in the Jewish State, Ben-Gurion could not be clearer:

Ben-Gurion envisaged Jewish-Arab relations in the prospective Jewish State not based on the transfer of the Arab population but as a true partnership among equal citizens; not "fortress Israel," a besieged European island in an ocean of Arab hostility, but a Jewish-Arab alliance.

These passages make it clear that Benny Morris has truncated, twisted, and distorted Ben-Gurion's vision of Jewish-Arab relations and the Zionist position on the question of transfer. All this is especially strange given that Morris contends that the historian "must remain honour-bound to gather and present his facts accurately."42

II. COLLUSION ACROSS THE JORDAN

Shlaim traces Israel's and Transjordan's alleged collusion to a secret meeting on November 17, 1947, in which King `Abdallah and Golda Meir agreed supposedly to frustrate the impending U.N. Resolution on Palestine and instead divide Palestine between themselves. He writes that

Is there any evidence for this alleged conspiracy? No, none at all. First, a careful examination of the two documents used to substantiate the claim of collusion -- reports by Ezra Danin and Eliyahu Sasson, two Zionist officials -- proves that Meir implacably opposed any agreement that would violate the U.N. partition resolution passed twelve days later. In no way did she consent to the Transjordan annexation of Arab areas of Palestine. Rather, Meir made it eminently clear that:

* Any Zionist-Hashemite arrangement would have to be compatible with the U.N. resolution. In Danin's words: "We explained that our matter was being discussed at the UN, that we hoped that it would be decided there to establish two states, one Jewish and one Arab, and that we wished to speak now about an agreement with him [i.e., `Abdallah] based on these resolutions."44 In Sasson's words: "Replied we prepared [to] give every assistance within [the] frame [of the] UN Charter."45

* The sole purpose of Transjordan's intervention in post-Mandatory Palestine would be, in Meir's words, "to maintain law and order and to preserve peace until the UN could establish a government in that area,"46 namely, a short-lived law-enforcement operation aimed at facilitating the establishment of a legitimate Palestinian government. Indeed, even `Abdallah did not expect the meeting to produce any concrete agreement. In Danin's words: "At the end he reiterated that concrete matters could be discussed only after the UN had passed its resolution, and said that we must meet again immediately afterwards."47

Secondly, Meir's account of her conversation with `Abdallah -- strangely omitted in this context by Shlaim (though he cites it elsewhere in his study) -- further confirms that Mandatory Palestine was not divided on November 17, 1947.

For our part we told him then that we could not promise to help his incursion into the country [i.e., Mandatory Palestine], since we would be obliged to observe the UN Resolution which, as we already reckoned at the time, would provide for the establishment of two states in Palestine. Hence, we could not -- so we said -- give active support to the violation of this resolution.48

Thirdly, Shlaim's thesis is predicated on the idea of a single diplomatic encounter's profoundly affecting the course of history. He navely subscribes to the notion that a critical decision about the making of war and peace or the division of foreign lands is made in the course of a single conversation, without consultations or extended bargaining. This account reflects a complete lack of understanding about the nature of foreign policymaking in general and of the Zionist decision-making process in particular.

Fourthly, as mere acting head of the Jewish Agency's political department, Meir was in no position to commit her movement to a binding deal with King `Abdallah, especially since that deal would run counter to the Jewish Agency's simultaneous efforts to win a U.N. resolution on partition. All she could do was try to convince `Abdallah not to oppose the impending U.N. partition resolution violently and give him the gist of Zionist thinking.

Fifthly, Meir's conversation with `Abdallah was never discussed by the Jewish Agency Executive, the Yishuv's effective government. The Yishuv's military operations during the 1947-49 war show not a trace of the alleged deal in either their planning or their execution. Quite the contrary, the Zionist leadership remained deeply suspicious of `Abdallah's expansionist ambitions up to May 1948.

Lastly, while the Jewish Agency unquestionably preferred `Abdallah to his Palestinian rival, the Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni, this preference did not lead the agency to preclude the possibility of a Palestinian state. As late as December 1948 (or more than a year after `Abdallah and Meir had allegedly divided Palestine), Ben-Gurion stated his preference for an independent Palestinian state to Transjordan's annexing the Arab parts of Mandatory Palestine. "An Arab State in Western Palestine is less dangerous than a state that is tied to Transjordan, and tomorrow -- probably to Iraq," he told his advisers. "Why should we vainly antagonize the Russians? Why should we do this [i.e., agree to Transjordan's annexation of Western Palestine] against the [wishes of the] rest of the Arab states?"49

In short, not only did the Zionist movement not collude with King `Abdallah to divide Mandatory Palestine between themselves but it was reconciled to the advent of a Palestinian state. `Abdallah was the one who was violently opposed to such an eventuality and who caused it to fail by seizing the bulk of the territory the United Nations had allocated to the Palestinians.

III. COLLUSION WITH GREAT BRITAIN

Shlaim writes that "Britain knew and approved of this secret Hashemite-Zionist agreement to divide up Palestine between themselves, not along the lines of the U.N. partition plan."50 This alleged British blessing was given in the above-noted conversation between Bevin and Abu'l-Huda, in which the foreign secretary gave the Transjordanian prime minister

This thesis is fundamentally flawed. True, the British were resigned to Transjordan's military foray into post-Mandatory Palestine, but this was not out of a wish to protect Jewish interests. Rather, it was directed against those interests: Israel was intended to be the victim of the Transjordanian intervention -- not its beneficiary.

* Contrary to Shlaim's claim, the British government did not know of a Hashemite-Zionist agreement to divide up Palestine, both because this agreement did not exist and because `Abdallah kept London in the dark about his contacts with the Jewish Agency. The influential British ambassador to Amman, Sir Alec Kirkbride, was not aware of the secret Meir-`Abdallah meeting until well after the event.52 How then could the British bless a Hashemite-Zionist deal?

* Glubb's memoirs alone indicate that Bevin gave Abu'l-Huda a green light to invade while warning him, "do not go and invade the areas allotted to the Jews."53 In contrast, declassified British documents unequivocally show that Bevin neither encouraged Abu'l-Huda to invade the Arab parts of Palestine as "the obvious thing to do," as claimed by Glubb, nor warned him off invading the Jewish areas. Bevin said only that he "would study the statements which his Excellency had made."54 Shlaim's choosing an old and partisan account over a newly released official document suggests a desperate attempt to prove the existence of such a warning.

* The British archives are bursting with evidence that the foreign secretary and his advisers cared not at all whether `Abdallah transgressed Jewish territory; they only wanted to be sure he did not implicate Britain in an embarrassing international situation. Shortly after the Bevin-Abu'l-Huda meeting, Bernard Burrows, head of the Eastern department, wrote (with Bevin's approval) that

More important, on May 7, 1948, a week before the all-Arab attack on Israel, Burrows suggested to the Foreign Office intimate to King `Abdallah that "we could in practice presumably not object to Arab Legion occupation of the Nejeb [i.e., Negev]."56 In other words, not only was the Foreign Office not opposed to Transjordan's occupation of the Jewish State's territory but it encouraged `Abdallah to go in and occupy about half of it.

* Having grudgingly recognized their inability to prevent the partition of Palestine, British officialdom wished to see a far smaller and weaker Jewish state than that envisaged by the U.N. partition resolution and did its utmost to bring about such an eventuality. Limitations of space do not allow a presentation of the overwhelming documentary evidence of British efforts to cut Israel "down to size" and stunt its population growth through the prevention of future Jewish immigration.57 Suffice to say that British policymakers sought to forestall an Israeli-Transjordanian peace agreement unless it detached the Negev from the Israeli state.

CONCLUSIONS

Recently declassified documents in Israeli and Western archives fail to confirm the picture of the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict painted by the new historians. The self-styled new historiography is really a "distortiography." It is anything but new: much of what it presents is old and much of the new is distortion. The "new historians" are neither new nor true historians but rather partisans seeking to give academic respectability to longstanding misconceptions and prejudice on the Arab-Israeli conflict. To borrow the words of the eminent British historian E.H. Carr, what the new historians are doing is to "write propaganda or historical fiction, and merely use facts of the past to embroider a kind of writing which has nothing to do with history."58

Returning to political issues of today: the Palestinian claim to national self-determination stands on its own and does not need buttressing from historical falsification. Quite the contrary, fabricating an Israeli history to cater to interests of the moment does great disservice not only to historical truth but also to the Palestinians that the new historians seek to champion. Instead, they should heed Albert Hourani's advice. Securing the future means coming to terms with one's past, however painful that might be, not denying it.

1 The Birth of Israel: Myths and Reality (New York: Pantheon, 1987), p. 4; see also pp. 10 and 233. 2 The new historians make much of their relatively young age: "Most of them, born around 1948, have matured in a more open, doubting, and self-critical Israel than the pre-1967, pre-1973, and pre-Lebanon War Israel of the old historians." Of course, biological age indicates little about outlook. The opponents of the new historians also matured "in a more open, doubting, and self-critical Israel," many of them belonging to the same age group and having lived in the same milieu as the new historians. Moreover, some new historians are older than the "old" historians, especially Flapan, who was born in 1911 and thus precisely a member of that generation that "had lived through 1948 as highly committed adult participants in the epic, glorious rebirth of the Jewish commonwealth" and that was consequently derided by the new historians as being "unable to separate their lives from the events they later recounted, unable to distance themselves from and regard impartially the facts and processes through which they had lived." Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 7. 3 Avi Shlaim writes: "At the time of the Basle Congress, Palestine was under the control of the Ottoman Turks. It was inhabited by nearly half a million Arabs and some 50,000 Jews. . . . But, in keeping with the spirit of the age of European imperialism, the Jews did not allow these local realities to stand in the way of their own national aspirations." Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 2. Ilan Papp has been far more outspoken in articulating Zionism as a brand of Western colonialism that "gained control over a land that is not theirs at the end of the nineteenth century." See, for example, "Damning the Historical Forgery," Kol Ha-ir, Oct. 6, 1995, p. 61.

4 Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 5 Avraham Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography, and Reality," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 28, No. 4Oct. 1992, pp. 623-89. 6 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 286; Shabtai Teveth, "The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem and its Origins," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2Apr. 1990, pp. 214-49. 7 Robert Satloff's review of Morris's Israel's Border Wars, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, Number 4 Oct. 1995, p. 954. 8 Benny Morris, "A Second Look at the `Missed Peace,' or Smoothing Out History: A Review Essay," Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1994, p. 86. 9 Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Aug. 1995, p. 289. See also Morris, 1948 and After, p. 7. 10 Shlaim, Collusion, p. viii. 11 Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," p. 296. 12 Jon Kimche and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill (London: Secker and Warburg, 1960), p. 60; Marie Syrkin, Golda Meir: Woman with a Cause (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), pp. 195-202. 13 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: New American Library, 1972), pp. 42-44. 14 Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 63-66. 15 For example, Kurzman, Genesis 1948, pp. 116-17; Zeev Sharef, Three Days (London: W.H. Allen, 1962), p. 77; and Kimche and Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, p. 39. As we shall see (on p. XX), the newly released official British documents do shed fresh light on the Bevin-Abu'l-Huda meeting but completely in the opposite direction from that claimed by Shlaim. 16 Kimche and Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, pp. 227-28; Rony Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study) (Geneva: Libraire E. Droz, 1959), pp. 108-11; and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 34-35. 17 Morris, 1948 and After, pp. 13-16; Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," pp. 294-95. 18 See, for example, Moshe Lissak, Yehuda Wallach, and Eviatar Nur, eds., Atlas Karta Le-toldot Medinat Israel: Shanim Rishonot, Tashah-Tashak (Karta Atlas of Israel: the First Years, 1948-61),(Jerusalem: Karta, 1978); Safran, From War to War, p. 30. 19 David Ben-Gurion, Medinat Israel Ha'mehudeshet, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 70-71, 98, 102, 106, and 115; idem, Israel: A Personal History (London: New English Library, 1972), pp. 61, 90; G. Rivlin and E. Orren, eds., Yoman Ha-milhama, 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Misrael Ha-bitahchom, Ha-hotsa'a La-or, 1983), particularly vol. 3, pp. 1013-19. 20 Ilan Papp, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992), p. 271. 21 See, for example, Martin Gilbert, The Second World War (London: Fontana, 1990), p. 746; National Register of the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, Statistics of Population on 29 September 1939 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office (hereafter HMSO), 1939. 22 "Casualties in Palestine since the United Nations Decision, Period 30th November, 1947 to 3rd April, 1945," CO 733/483/5, p. 19. 23 Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," p. 296. On the Jordanian side, Col. `Abdallah at-Tall, who served as a messenger between King `Abdallah and the Zionists during the armistice talks at the end of the 1947-49 war, then defected to Egypt and wrote about his experiences in Karithat Filastin: Mudhakkirat `Abdallah at-Tall, Qa'id Ma`rakat al-Quds (Cairo: Al-Qalam, 1959). On the Israeli side, Lt. Col. Israel Baer, an adviser to Ben-Gurion later convicted of spying for the Soviet Union, told about the negotiations in Bithon Israel: Etmol, ha-Yom, Mahar (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966). 24 Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," pp. 623-24. See also his article "Arab Historiography of the 1948 War: The Quest for Legitimacy," in Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New Perspectives on Israeli History (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 124-54. 25 Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," p. 297. 26 Morris, Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 294. 27 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (London: W.H. Allen, 1970), pp. 458-66; Gabbay, A Political Study, pp. 54, 85-98. 28 Joseph B. Schechtman, The Arab Refugee Problem (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), p. 4. 29 Aharon Klieman, Du Kium Le-lo Shalom (Unpeaceful Coexistence: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians) (Tel Aviv: Ma`ariv, 1986), pp. 15-16. 30 Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," p. 289. And, years earlier, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Lillienthal, Noam Chomsky, and Edward Said all used these same arguments. 31 Morris, 1948 and After, p. 17. "Yishuv" refers to the Zionist community in Palestine before the establishment of Israel. 32 Morris, Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 24. 33 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 34 Protocols of the Jewish Agency Executive meetings of June 7, 9, and 12, 1938, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. 35 The Peel report suggested the partition of Mandatory Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish; to reduce frictions between the two communities, the commission also suggested a land and population exchange, similar to that effected between Turkey and Greece after the First World War. See Palestine Royal Commission, Report, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937, Cmd. 5479 (London: HMSO, 1937), pp. 291-95. There being far more Arabs in the Jewish state-to-be than the other way around (225,000 vs. 1,250), Ben-Gurion and some other Zionist proponents of partition viewed this exchange (or transfer, as it came to be known) as a partial compensation for the confinement of the prospective Jewish state to a tiny fraction of the Land of Israel.

Yet they quickly dismissed this idea, as shown by the fact that not one of the 30-odd submissions the JAE made to the Palestine Partition Commission (the Woodhead Commission, 1938) suggested population exchange and transfer.

36 Morris, The Birth, pp. 27-28. 37 Ibid., p. 28. 38 Ibid. Morris traces the speech to Dec. 3, 1947, as is done in the secondary source from which he borrowed it. In the original source, however, the date given is Dec. 13, 1947. 39 Rivlin and Orren, eds., Yoman Ha-milhama, vol. I, p. 22. 40 Ben-Gurion, Ba-ma'araha, vol. IV, part 2 (Tel Aviv: Hotsa'at Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisra'el, 1959), pp. 258-59 (emphasis added). 41 Ibid., p. 260. 42 Morris, 1948 and After, p. 47. 43 Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 1; idem, The Politics of Partition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. viii (this is an abridged and slightly revised edition of Collusion). Other new historians have taken up this thesis. Thus, Papp: "The common ground for the agreement was a mutual objection to the creation of a Palestinian state. . . . The Jewish Agency in particular abhorred such a possibility, asserting that the creation of a Palestinian state would perpetuate the ideological conflict in Palestine" (The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 118). 44 Ezra Danin, "Siha in Abdallah, 17.11.47," Central Zionist Archives, S25/4004. 45 Sasson to Shertok, Nov. 20, 1947, Central Zionist Archives, S25/1699. 46 Danin, "Siha in Abdallah." 47 Ibid. 48 Golda Meir's verbal report to the Provisional State Council on May 12, 1948, Israel State Archives, Provisional State Council: Protocols, 18 April - 13 May 1948, Jerusalem, 1978, p. 40.[Eds: the collection had an English title. Yeshivat Minhelet Ha-am, 12/5/48.] 49 Ben-Gurion, Yoman Ha-milhama, vol. III, Dec. 18, 1948, p. 885. 50 Shlaim, "The Debate," p. 297. 51 Ibid., p. 293. 52 See, for example, Kirkbride's telegram to Bevin dated Nov. 17, 1947, displaying total ignorance of the Abdullah-Meir meeting, which was held that very day (FO 816/89). For further evidence of British ignorance of the alleged Hashemite-Jewish deal, see a personal and secret letter from H. Beeley, Eastern Department, Foreign Office, to T.E. Bromley, Jan. 20, 1948, FO 371/68403/E1877; and Michael Wright, "Brief for Conversation with Transjordan Prime on Palestine," Feb. 6, 1948, FO 371/6837/E1980G. 53 Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 66. 54 Mr. Bevin to Sir Alec Kirkbride (Amman), "Conversation with the Transjordan Prime Minister," Feb. 9, 1948, FO 371/68366/E1916/G. 55 Memorandum by Bernard Burrows, Feb. 9, 1948, FO 371/68368/E296. 56 Bernard Burrows, "Palestine After May 14," May 7, 1948, FO 371/68854/E6778. 57 For a discussion of this issue, see Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: "The New Historians" (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming). 58 E.H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 29.

Related Topics: Arab-Israel conflict & diplomacy, History, Israel & Zionism, Middle East studies | Efraim Karsh | June 1996 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.

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Rewriting Israel's History :: Middle East Quarterly

Akhlah, the Jewish children’s learning network

Posted By on November 4, 2015

Dear Akhlah Friends and Family:

Sixteen years ago, I saw a need for Jewish education materials designed just for very young children that would be freely available online. A site where Jewish families who lived far from a temple or shul, or didn't have access to a congregational cheder, could access the teaching/learning materials that would strengthen their childrens' connection to their Jewish heritage. No advertisements, no off-site links, no subscription charges, just a place for learning the alef-bet and the Hebrew language, Judaism's history, and all about Israel and the people who helped build her. So I began creating Akhlah's pages, every year adding more categories, and now Akhlah has users all around the world, with more than 12,000 unique users every day.

I'm proud of Akhlah; I very much want to keep it alive and growing. But I am facing a diagnosis and consequent surgery that may oblige me to set all my work on Akhlah aside. I will not be able to cover Akhlah's expenses for the next few months and I must ask for your assistance. Without your financial support, Akhlah cannot be sustained. Please consider helping out in this time of need. Your donation will keep Akhlah online through this crisis, and I will soon, I pray, be able to return to my regular job and resume my role as Akhlah's backbone.

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Akhlah, the Jewish children's learning network

Zionist | Define Zionist at Dictionary.com

Posted By on November 4, 2015

Contemporary Examples

The more hawkish zionist Organization of America declared the condemnation downright shocking.

Finally, as a zionist, this deification of trauma appalls me.

In fact, many "delegitimizers" explicitly refrain from supporting a partial boycott lest they be seen as zionist sympathizers.

Bennett is very popular, and many among the right and religious zionist community see him as a savior-type figure.

The internal zionist arguments are thus over what we mean, by new.

Historical Examples

In this sense Herzl could say later that the Dreyfus affair had made him a zionist.

The zionist regards it as contemptible to conceal his nationality.

His speech revealed the great transformation that had taken place in Herzl's organic relation to the zionist movement.

The bibliography and the chronology were prepared by the zionist Archives and Library.

Remarked that he "might become a zionist if it could be accomplished in Zion."

British Dictionary definitions for zionist Expand

a political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine, now concerned chiefly with the development of the modern state of Israel

a policy or movement for Jews to return to Palestine from the Diaspora

Derived Forms

Zionist, noun, adjectiveZionistic, adjective

Word Origin and History for zionist Expand

"movement for forming (later supporting) a Jewish national state in Palestine," 1896, from German Zionismus (from Zion + Latin-derived suffix -ismus; see -ism); first recorded 1886 in "Selbstemancipation," by "Matthias Acher" (pseudonym of Nathan Birnbaum).

zionist in Culture Expand

The belief that Jews should have their own nation; Jewish nationalism. Zionism gained much support among Jews and others in the early twentieth century, and the hoped-for nation was established in the late 1940s in Palestine, as the state of Israel. Zionism is opposed by most Arabs. (See Arab-Israeli conflict.)

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Zionist | Define Zionist at Dictionary.com

Anti-Defamation League | No Place for Hate | Houston

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The No Place for Hate initiative provides educators and students with the resources to ensure that anti-bias and diversity education are an integral part of the school curriculum. No Place for Hate also helps to create and sustain inclusive school environments where all students feel valued and have the opportunity to succeed by promoting respect for individual difference while challenging bigotry and prejudice. Launched in schools in 2001, the popular initiative has been embraced by hundreds of campuses throughout the Southwest region, including many in the Houston, San Antonio/Central Texas and El Paso areas. ADL is grateful to the H-E-B Tournament of Champions for the generous underwriting of the No Place for Hate initiative.

ADL also is grateful to all the participating No Place for Hate campuses and congratulates them for achieving the designation in the 2014-2015 school year. See list of schools.

Becoming a No Place for Hate campus is easily achieved by followingstep-by-step instructions.

ResourcesADL has many resourcesdesigned to help you achieve your No Place for Hate designation. For some helpful links, see below.

ADL Education & OutreachWebsiteSample No Place for Hate ProjectsCurrent Events ClassroomAnti-Bias WorkshopsMulti-CulturalBibliographyCurriculum Connections Free Online Diversity & Anti-Bias CurriculumAnti-Bullying ResourcesEchoes and ReflectionsBook of the MonthPyramid of Hate

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Hamas to kids: Shoot all the Jews – YouTube

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Bulletin: http://www.palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=... Video: http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=472&... Al-Aqsa TV (Hamas) program Tomorrow's Pioneers on neighbors' rights. Phone conversation between Nahul the bee and Qais, a boy from Jenin (West Bank).

Nahul the bee, (adult in a giant bee costume): "Listen my friend. Are there Jews where you are?" Boy (Qais): "No. Not at the moment." Nahul: "I heard they come to you every day." Boy: "Yes, but not now." Nahul: "Listen, friend; do like this with your hands [makes fists], and when they come to you, punch them; make their face red like a tomato." Boy: "Allah willing, so that we can liberate Palestine." Nahul: "Allah willing." ...

[Nahul talks to TV host, young girl named Rawan] Nahul: "My friend Qais - anyway, Rawan, I tell him to take a stone, and when the Jews come, to take it and throw it at them." Child host (Rawan): "Of course, the Jewish neighbors." Nahul: "To smash them." Child host: "If his neighbors are Jews or Zionists? Yes." ...

[Child host Rawan talks to Tulin, a girl in the studio.] Child host Rawan: "Tulin, why do you want to be a police officer? Like who?" Girl Tulin: "Like my uncle." Child host: "Which uncle?" Girl: "Ahmed." Child host: "Is he a policeman?" [Girl nods] Child host: "OK, so what does a policeman do?" Nahul (adult in giant bee costume): "He catches thieves, and people who make trouble." Child host: "And shoots Jews. Right?" Girl: "Yes." Child host: "You want to be like him?" [Girl nods] Child host: "Allah willing, when you grow up." Girl: "So that I can shoot Jews." [Nahul the bee cheers] Child host: "All of them? All of them?" Girl: "Yes." Child host: "Good." [Al-Aqsa TV (Hamas), May 2, 2014]

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Hamas to kids: Shoot all the Jews - YouTube

2014 IsraelGaza conflict – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Posted By on November 4, 2015

Operation Protective Edge 2014 Part of the GazaIsrael conflict (left) A home in Gaza bombed by Israel (right) Iron Dome missile defense system in operation Date 8 July 26 August 2014 (49 days) Location Gaza Strip Israel Result

Victory claimed by both sides[9]

Gazan militant groups

Al-Qassam Brigades: 20,000[14]40,000[15]

Gaza Health Ministry: 2,203 killed [a][21][22] 10,626 wounded[21] UN HRC: 2,251 killed (referenced information from GHM)[b][23] ITIC: 1,552 killed [c][24] Israel MFA: 2,125 killed (interim findings)[d][25]

a 70% civilians[22] b 65% civilians[23] c 31% civilians, 30% combatants, 39% unidentified [24]

The 2014 IsraelGaza conflict, also known as Operation Protective Edge (Hebrew: , Miv'tza Tzuk Eitan, lit. "Operation Strong Cliff")[note 1] was a military operation launched by Israel on 8 July 2014 in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.[note 2] Thereafter, following the IDF Operation Brother's Keeper, Hamas started rocket attacks, targeting Israeli cities and infrastructure, resulting in seven weeks of Israeli operations. The Israeli strikes, the Palestinian rocket attacks and the ground fighting resulted in the death of thousands of people, the vast majority of them Gazans.[18][31]

The stated aim of the Israeli operation was to stop rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, which increased after an Israeli crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank was launched following the 12 June kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers by two Hamas members.[32][33][34] Conversely, Hamas's goal was to bring international pressure to bear to lift Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip, end Israel's offensive, obtain a third party to monitor and guarantee compliance with a ceasefire,[35] release Palestinian prisoners and overcome its political isolation.[36] Some claim Israel was the first, on 13 June, to break the ceasefire agreement with Hamas that had been in place since November 2012.[37] However, Israel argues its air raids on Gaza are responses to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip.[38]

On 7 July, after seven Hamas militants died in a tunnel explosion in Khan Yunis which was caused by an Israeli airstrike (per Hamas, Nathan Thrall, BBC and a senior IDF official[39]) or an accidental explosion of their own munitions (per the IDF), Hamas assumed responsibility for rockets fired into Israel and launched 40 rockets towards Israel.[40][41]

The operation officially began the following day, and on 17 July, the operation was expanded to an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza with the stated aim of destroying Gaza's tunnel system;[42] Israeli ground forces withdrew on 5 August.[43] On 26 August, an open-ended ceasefire was announced.[44] By that date, the IDF reported that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other militant groups had fired 4,564 rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel, with over 735 intercepted in flight and shot down by Iron Dome. Most Gazan mortar and rocket fire hit open land, more than 280 fell on areas in Gaza,[45] and 224 struck residential areas.[46][47] Militant rocketry also killed 13 Gazan civilians, 11 of them children.[48][49] The IDF attacked 5,263 targets in Gaza; at least 34 known tunnels were destroyed[46] and two-thirds of Hamas's 10,000-rocket arsenal was used up or destroyed.[50][51]

Between 2,142[52] and 2,310[21] Gazans were killed and between 10,626[21] and 10,895[53] were wounded (including 3,374 children, of whom over 1,000 were left permanently disabled[54]). 66 Israeli soldiers, 5 Israeli civilians (including one child)[55] and one Thai civilian were killed[18] and 469 IDF soldiers and 261 Israeli civilians were injured.[20] The Gaza Health Ministry, UN and some human rights groups reported that 6975% of the Palestinian casualties were civilians;[18][22][53] Israeli officials estimated that around 50% of those killed were civilians.[56][57] On 5 August, OCHA stated that 520,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (approximately 30% of its population) might have been displaced, of whom 485,000 needed emergency food assistance[58] and 273,000 were taking shelter in 90 UN-run schools.[59] The UN calculated that more than 7,000 homes for 10,000 families were razed, together with an additional 89,000 homes damaged, of which roughly 10,000 were severely affected by the bombing.[60] Rebuilding costs were calculated to run from 4-6 billions dollars, over 20 years.[61] In Israel, an estimated 5,000[62] to 8,000[63] citizens temporarily fled their homes due to the threat of rocketry from Gaza.[62] The economic cost of the operation is estimated at NIS 8.5 billion (approximately 2.5 billion USD) and GDP loss of 0.4%.[64] At the conclusion of hostilities 3,000-3,700 claims for damages had been submitted by Israelis, and $41 million paid out for property damage and missed work days.[46] Reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $11 million.[65]

In 2005, then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally withdrew Israeli forces and settlements from the Gaza Strip.[66] Nonetheless, the ICRC,[67] the UN[68] and various human rights organizations[69][70][71] consider Israel to still be the de facto occupying power due to its control of Gaza's borders, air space and territorial waters.[72][73]

The following year, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative elections. The outcome disconcerted Israel, the United States and the Quartet, and they demanded Hamas accept all previous agreements, recognize Israel's right to exist, and renounce violence; when Hamas refused,[74] they cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority. In mid-2006 an Israeli soldier was captured by Hamas in a cross-border raid. The United States, in response to Fatah moves in October 2006 to form a unity government with Hamas, tried to undo the elections by arming Fatah to overthrow Hamas in Gaza.[75] Hamas preempted the coup and took complete power by force.[76][77][78][79][80]

Israel then defined Gaza as a "hostile territory" forming no part of a sovereign state and put Gaza under a comprehensive economic and political blockade,[81] which also denied access to a third of its arable land and 85% of its fishing areas. It has led to considerable economic damage and humanitarian problems in Gaza.[82][83][84][85] The overwhelming consensus of international institutions is that the blockade is a form of collective punishment and illegal.[86][87][88][89][90] Israel maintains that the blockade is legal and necessary to limit Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip on its cities and to prevent Hamas from obtaining other weapons.[91][92][93][94][95] Israel carried out Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 with the stated aim of stopping rocket attacks from Hamas militants.[96] It led to a decrease in Palestinian rocket attacks.[97] The UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict concluded that the operation was "a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability".[98] The Israeli government's analysis concludes that the report perverts international law to serve a political agenda and sends a "legally unfounded message to states everywhere confronting terrorism that international law has no effective response to offer them".[99]

Influenced in the Arab Spring and by demonstrations in Ramallah and Gaza, the gap between Hamas and Fatah was bridged in 2011. After the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas declared his willingness to travel to Gaza and sign an agreement, the IDF killed two Hamas activists in Gaza; the IDF stated the killings were in response to the launching of a single Qassam rocket, which hit no one, but Yedioth Ahronoth's Alex Fishman argued they were a "premeditated escalation" by Israel.[100][bettersourceneeded] In an interview with CNN, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the reconciliation talks were calls for Israel's destruction, and strongly opposed the idea of a unity government.[101]

On 14 November 2012, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defence in the Gaza Strip. The operation was preceded by a period with a number of mutual IsraeliPalestinian responsive attacks.[102] According to the Israeli government, the operation began in response to the launch of over 100 rockets at Israel during a 24-hour period,[103] an attack by Gaza militants on an Israeli military patrol jeep within Israeli borders,[104] and an explosion caused by IEDs, which occurred near Israeli soldiers, on the Israeli side of a tunnel passing under the Israeli West Bank barrier.[105][106] The Israeli government stated that the aims of the military operation were to halt rocket attacks against civilian targets originating from the Gaza Strip[107] and to disrupt the capabilities of militant organizations.[108] The Palestinians blamed the Israeli government for the upsurge in violence, accusing the IDF of attacks on Gazan civilians in the days leading up to the operation.[109] They cited the blockade of the Gaza Strip and the occupation of West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as the reason for rocket attacks.[110] A week later, on 21 November, Egypt brokered a ceasefire to the conflict which contained the following agreements:[111][112]

Both Israel and Hamas argue that the other violated the 2012 ceasefire agreement, resulting in 1 Israeli and 8 Gazan deaths and 5 Israeli and 66 Gazan injuries. According to the Israeli Security Agency (Shabak) there was a sharp decrease in attacks from Gaza in 2013.[113] Nevertheless, 63 rockets (average 5 per month) were launched in 36 rocket attacks in addition to various mortar attacks, all prohibited by the November 2012 ceasefire. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR)[114] reported monthly Israeli attacks involving drones, missiles, small arms fire and airstrikes. Six of the deaths in Gaza occurred in the border area's Access Restricted Areas (ARAs, non-demarcated zones within Gazan territory unilaterally defined by Israel as being of restricted access), despite the ceasefire's prohibition on Israeli attacks on these areas.[32][114] OCHAO, more broadly sourced data, reported 11 deaths in Gaza and 81 injuries for 2013.[115]

In the first three months after the IDF Operation Pillar of Defense, according to Ben White, two mortar shells struck Israeli territory, while four Gazans were shot dead and 91 were wounded by Israeli forces who fired inside Gazan territory on 63 occasions, made 13 incursions into the Strip, and attacked the Gazan fishing fleet 30 times.[116] Israeli attacks on Gaza steadily increased during the second half of 2013, notwithstanding the decrease in attacks from Gaza.[117][not in citation given]

From December 2012 to late June/early July 2014, Hamas did not fire rockets into Israel, and tried to police other groups doing so.[118] These efforts were largely successful; Netanyahu stated in March 2014 that the rocket fire in the past year was the "lowest in a decade."[32][118][119] According to Shabak, in the first half of 2014 there were 181 rocket attacks[120] compared to 55 rocket attacks in whole 2013.[113]

As occasional rocket fire continued, the blockade of Gaza continued in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement.[121] "Crossings were repeatedly shut and buffer zones were reinstated. Imports declined, exports were blocked, and fewer Gazans were given exit permits to Israel and the West Bank."[32]

Israel halted construction material going to Gaza after it stated that it had discovered a tunnel leading into Israel, some 300m from a kibbutz. The IDF said it was the third tunnel discovered that year and that the previous two were packed with explosives.[122]

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were 85 rocket attacks in the first five months of 2014.[123] Most of the 85 rockets were fired in March, after the IDF killed 3 members of Islamic Jihad. The members of the PIJ say they were firing rockets in response to an incursion by Israeli tanks and bulldozers into Gazan territory east of the Khan Yunis area.[124][125][126] The IDF said they were conducting routine military patrols near the Gaza border when they came under fire, and thus responded with airstrikes.[127][128]

Leading up to the collapse of the 201314 IsraeliPalestinian peace talks, in the face of Netanyahu's perceived reluctance to make desired concessions, Mahmoud Abbas decided to forge a deal with Hamas.[129] With its alliance with Syria and Iran weakened, the loss of power by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after a coup dtat in Egypt, and the economic impact of the closure of its Rafah tunnels by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,[129] on 23 April 2014, ending seven divisive years, Hamas agreed to reconciliation under a unity government with the other main Palestinian faction, Fatah.[130][131] The government accepted by Hamas was to be run exclusively by PNA technocrats.[129]

This Palestinian unity government was sworn in by 2 June 2014[132][133] and Israel announced it would not negotiate any peace deal with the new government and would push punitive measures.[134] Netanyahu took Palestinian unity as a threat rather than an opportunity.[129][135] On the eve of the agreement he stated that the proposed reconciliation would "strengthen terrorism", and called on the international community to avoid embracing it.[136] Most of the outside world, including the European Union, Russia, China, India, Turkey, France and the United Kingdom, proved cautiously optimistic, and subsequently expressed their support for new arrangement. The United States, more skeptical, announced it would continue to work with the PNA-directed unity government.[137] Israel itself suspended negotiations with the PNA[138] and, just after[139] the announcement, launched an airstrike, which missed its target and wounded a family of three bystanders.[133][140] Netanyahu had warned before the deal that it would be incompatible with IsraeliPalestinian peace and that Abbas had to choose between peace with Hamas and peace with Israel. When a reconciliation deal was signed, opening the way to the appointment of the new government, Netanyahu chaired a security cabinet which voted to authorise Netanyahu to impose unspecified sanctions against the Palestinian Authority.[133]

On 4 June, the day before Naksa Day, the Israeli Housing and Construction Ministry published tenders for 1,500 settlement units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in a move Minister Uri Ariel said was an "appropriate Zionist response to the Palestinian terror government."[141][142]Marwan Bishara, senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, alleged that Israel had hoped to disrupt the Palestinian national unity government between Fatah and Hamas by its operation.[143]

On Nakba Day, 15 May 2014, two Palestinian youth, Nadeem Siam Nawara, 17, and Mohammad Mahmoud Odeh Abu Daher, 16, were killed by Israeli sniper fire using live ammunition near Ofer military prison in the West Bank city of Beitunia. Many Palestinians say this was the first action that began the 2014 conflict,[citation needed] named Operation Protective Edge, by Israel. On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank: Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah. Israel blamed Hamas, with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that he had "unequivocal proof" that Hamas was involved and that the abduction was linked to Palestinian reconciliation,[129] and the IDF stated that the two men Israel suspected of having kidnapped the teenagers were known members of Hamas.[145][146] No evidence of Hamas involvement was offered by Israeli authorities at the time.[32][129][147] High-ranking members of Hamas denied the group had any involvement in the incident,[148] and ex-Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin doubted Hamas had any involvement.[135] The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank attributed the abductions to the Qawasameh clan, notorious for acting against Hamas's policies and any attempts to reach an entente with Israel.[149] Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal said he could neither confirm nor deny the kidnapping of the three Israelis, but congratulated the abductors.[150] The kidnappings were condemned by human rights organizations.[151][152] Documents released by Israel suggest that Hamas member Hussam Qawasmeh organized the kidnappings with $60,000 provided by his brother Mahmoud through a Hamas association in Gaza, after requesting support for a "military operation".[153] On 20 August, Saleh al-Arouri, an exiled Hamas leader based in Turkey, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the three Israeli teens: "Our goal was to ignite an intifada in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as within the 1948 borders... Your brothers in the Al-Qassam Brigades carried out this operation to support their imprisoned brothers, who were on a hunger strike... The mujahideen captured these settlers in order to have a swap deal."[154] Palestinian security forces said the kidnappings were organized by Saleh al-Arouri.[155] Khalid Meshaal, head in exile of Hamas's political wing since 2004, acknowledged that Hamas members were responsible, but stated that its political leaders had no prior knowledge of the abduction, were not involved in military details and learnt of it through the ensuing Israeli investigations. He also said that while Hamas was opposed to targeting civilians, he understood that Palestinians "frustrated with oppression" were exercising a "legitimate right of resistance" against the occupation by undertaking such operations.[156][157][158][159] Israel states that the IDF and the Shin Bet have foiled between 54[160] and 64 kidnapping plots since 2013. The PA said it had foiled 43 of them.[161]

Withholding evidence in its possession suggesting that the teens had been killed immediately until 1 July,[129][162][163] Israel launched Operation Brother's Keeper, a large-scale crackdown of what it called Hamas's terrorist infrastructure and personnel in the West Bank,[164] ostensibly aimed at securing the release of the kidnapped teenagers. During the operation, 11 Palestinians were killed and 51 wounded in 369 Israeli incursions into the West Bank through to 2 July,[37][165][166][167][168][169] and between 350 and 600 Palestinians,[148][165][170][171] including nearly all of Hamas's West Bank leaders,[172][173][174] were arrested.[175][176][177] Among those arrested were many people who had only recently been freed under the terms of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange.[178] Israeli military spokesman Lt. Col. Peter Lerner defended the arrests, stating that Hamas members had carried out 60 abduction attempts on Israelis in the West Bank "in the last year and a half", and that "Hamas does not need to give a direct order."[179] The arrests yielded no information about the abduction.[129]Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch stated that certain aspects of the operation amounted to collective punishment,[180][181] and B'tselem said in a press release that the actions have caused "disproportionate harm to the basic rights of Palestinians".[182] During the course of the operation, Israel said it had uncovered a Hamas plot to launch a massive wave of violence throughout the West Bank, with the goal of overthrowing the Palestinian Authority. The purported coup plotters were arrested and their weapons stockpiles were seized[183][184]

On 30 June, search teams found the bodies of the three missing teenagers near Hebron.[185][186][187] After their burial, an anti-Arab riot broke out, and a Palestinian teenager was murdered in revenge. His killing sparked Arab rioting.[188][189] Israel police arrested six suspects belonging to the Beitar Jerusalem F.C. supporters' group La Familia[190][191] and charged three of them with murder.[192][193]

As part of its crackdown, Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas facilities in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas apparently refrained from retaliating, though it did not impede other factions from firing rockets towards Israel.[129] From 1 May to 11 June, six rockets and three mortar shells were launched from Gaza towards Israel. From 12 to 30 June 44 rockets and 3 mortar shells were launched from Gaza. On 29 June, an Israeli airstrike on a rocket crew killed a Hamas operative, while at least 18 rockets were launched from Gaza through the next day by Hamas according to both J.J. Goldberg and Assaf Sharon,[129] with Goldberg stating that it was the first time Hamas directly launched rockets since the conflict in 2012.[162] Overnight, on 30 June 1 July, Israeli airstrikes struck 34 Gaza targets in what officials stated was a response to the Sunday rocketry,[194] while Stuart Greer reported the strikes were revenge for the deaths of the three youths.[195] From the day of the abductions on 12 June through 5 July 117 rockets were launched from Gaza and there were approximately 80 Israeli airstrikes on Gaza.[196][197]

Israel sought a ceasefire but refused to accept Hamas's condition that Palestinians arrested in the West Bank crackdown be released.[129] In a meeting held on 2 July to discuss the crisis, Hamas reportedly tried but failed to persuade armed factions in Gaza to uphold the truce with Israel.[198] Following escalating rocket fire from Gaza, Israel issued a warning on 4 July that it "would only be able to sustain militant rocket fire for another 24, or maximum 48, hours before undertaking a major military offensive."[199] Hamas declared it was prepared to halt the rocket fire in exchange for an agreement by Israel to stop airstrikes. Netanyahu said Israel would only act against further rocket attacks.[200] On 5 July, Hamas official Osama Hamdan said rocket fire would continue until Israel lifted its import restrictions on Gaza and the Palestinian Authority transferred money to pay Hamas civil servants.[201] Between 4 and 6 July, a total of 62 rockets where fired from Gaza and the IAF attacked several targets in Gaza.[202][203][204] The following day, Hamas assumed formal responsibility for launching rocket attacks on Israel.[32] Hamas increased rocket attacks on Israel,[121] and by 7 July had fired 100 rockets from Gaza at Israeli territory; at the same time, the Israeli Air Force had bombed several sites in Gaza.[205][206][207] Early on 8 July, the IAF bombed 50 targets in the Gaza Strip.[208] Israel's military also stopped a militant infiltration from the sea.[208] Brigadier General Moti Almoz, the chief spokesman of the Israeli military, said: "We have been instructed by the political echelon to hit Hamas hard."[118] Hamas insisted that Israel end all attacks on Gaza, release those re-arrested during the crackdown in the West Bank, lift the blockade on Gaza and return to the cease-fire conditions of 2012 as conditions for a ceasefire.[209]

As the Israeli operation began, and the IDF bombarded targets in the Gaza Strip with artillery and airstrikes, Hamas continued to fire rockets and mortar shells into Israel in response. A cease-fire proposal was announced by the Egyptian government on 14 July, backed by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas;[210] the Israeli government accepted it and temporarily stopped hostilities on the morning of 15 July, but Hamas rejected it in "its current form", citing the fact Hamas has not been consulted in the formation of the ceasefire and it omitted many of their demands.[211][212] By 16 July, the death toll within Gaza had surpassed 200 people.[213]

On 16 July, Hamas and Islamic Jihad offered the Israeli government a 10-year truce with ten conditions centred on the lifting of the blockade and the release of prisoners who were released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap and were re-arrested; it was not accepted.[214][215] On 17 July, a five-hour humanitarian ceasefire, proposed by the UN, took place. Approximately five and a half hours prior to the ceasefire's effect, the IDF sighted 13 armed Hamas militants emerging from a Gazan tunnel on the Israeli side of the Gaza border. IDF destroyed the tunnel's exit, ending the incursion.[216][217] After the ceasefire, IDF began a ground offensive on the Gaza Strip focused on destroying tunnels crossing the Israel border. On 20 July, the Israeli military entered Shuja'iyya, a populous neighborhood of Gaza City, resulting in heavy fighting.

On 24 July, over 10,000 Palestinians in the West Bank protested against the Israeli operation; 2 Palestinian protesters died.[218] 150 Hamas militants who surrendered to the IDF were being questioned about Hamas operations.[219] On 25 July, an Israeli airstrike killed Salah Abu Hassanein, the leader of Islamic Jihad's military wing.[220] On 26 July, another humanitarian ceasefire took place for twelve hours,[221] followed by a unilateral extension by Israel for another twenty-four hours, which was rejected by Hamas.[222] The Palestinian death toll in the Gaza Strip topped 1,000.[223]

On 1 August, the US and UN announced that Israel and Palestine had agreed to a 72-hour ceasefire starting at 08:00. There was dispute about the terms of the ceasefire: Israel and the US stated that they allowed Israel to "continue to do operations to destroy tunnels that pose a threat to Israeli territory that lead from the Gaza Strip into Israel proper as long as those tunnels exist on the Israel side of their lines"; Hamas said that it would not accept such a condition.[224][225] The ceasefire broke down almost immediately after it started. Israel blamed Hamas for violating the ceasefire, saying a group of Israeli soldiers were attacked by Palestinian militants emerging from a tunnel.[226] Palestinians said the IDF was the first to breach the ceasefire when at 08:30 it destroyed 19 buildings while undertaking work to demolish tunnels.[225] According to the PLO, the Palestinian Authority and Gazan sources, Hamas attacked an Israeli unit, killing an Israeli officer (Hadar Goldin, who was initially thought to have been captured) while Israeli forces were still engaged in military activities in Rafah on Gaza's territory before the truce came into effect. Tweets reported the battle in Rafah before the deadline for the cease-fire.[225] Hamas also killed two soldiers in a suicide bombing attack.[227] Senior Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk accused Israel of creating pretexts to undermine the Gaza ceasefire and said that Palestinian fighters abducted the officer and killed the two soldiers before the start of the humanitarian truce,[228] which a Hamas witness has stated began at 7:30 and lasted five minutes,[229] while Israel said the event took place at 09:20, after the 08:00 start of the ceasefire.[230][231][232]

On 3 August, IDF pulled most of its ground forces out of the Gaza Strip after completing the destruction of 32 tunnels built by Hamas and other militants.[43][233][234] On 5 August Israel announced that it had arrested Hossam Kawasmeh on 11 July, and suspected him of having organized the killing of the three teenagers. According to court documents, Kawasmeh stated that Hamas members in Gaza financed the recruitment and arming of the killers.[235][236]

On 10 August, another Egyptian proposal for a 72-hour ceasefire was negotiated and agreed upon Israeli and Palestinian officials, and on 13 August it was extended for another 120 hours to allow both sides to continue negotiations for a long-term solution to end the month-long fighting.[237] On 19 August, a 24 hour ceasefire extension renewal was violated just hours after agreement with 29 Hamas rockets fired in 20 minutes, with IAF airstrikes in response, killing 9 Gazans. The Israeli delegation was ordered home from Cairo.[238]

On 21 August, an Israeli airstrike in Rafah killed three of Hamas's top commanders: Mohammed Abu Shammala, Raed al Atar and Mohammed Barhoum.[239] During the period from 22 to 26 August, over than 700 rockets and mortar shells fired into Israel, killing 3 Israelis. On 26 August, Israel and Hamas accepted another cease-fire at 19:00.[240]

On 16 September, Mortar shell fired to Israel for the first time since the cease-fire. Citizens worried that the fighting would resume with the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the new year (Rosh Hashanah). Defense Minister, Moshe Yaalon estimated that fighting would not resume with the Gaza Strip at the end of this month.[241] Abbas call for UNSC resolution to end Mideast conflict. Hollande, French president show supported in his effort.[242] On Tuesday, 20 September, negotiations between Israel and Gaza will begin in Cairo.[243]

According to Palestinians on 1 October, Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip and fired upon Palestinian farmers and farms. No injuries were reported.[244][245][246]

IDF reported that on 31 October a rocket or a mortar shell was launched from Gaza into southern Israel without causing harm.[247]

On 23 November, a Palestinian farmer was shot dead in Gaza, marking the first time a Palestinian from Gaza had been killed by Israeli fire since a seven-week war between Israel and Hamas militants ended with an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire on 26 August. The Israeli army said two Palestinians had approached the border fence and had ignored calls to halt, prompting troops to fire warning shots in the air. "Once they didn't comply, they fired towards their lower extremities. There was one hit," a spokeswoman said.[248]

As of 20 July 2014[update], hospitals in Gaza were ill-equipped and faced severe shortages of various kinds of medicine, medical supplies, and fuel.[251] Egypt temporarily reopened the Rafah crossing with Gaza to allow medical supplies to enter and injured Palestinians to receive treatment in Egypt.[252] Due to the operation, prices of food, including fish and produce, rose dramatically.[253] A 21 July news report stated that over 83,000 Palestinians had taken shelter in UN facilities.[254] Fatah officials accused Hamas of mishandling humanitarian aid meant for civilians. According to them, Hamas took the aid, which included clothing, mattresses, medicine, water, and food, and distributed it among Hamas members or sold it on the black market for profit.[255][256]

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 273,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip had been displaced as of 31 July 2014, of whom 236,375 (over eleven percent of the Gazan population) were taking shelter in 88 UNRWA schools. UNRWA exhausted its capacity to absorb displaced persons, and overcrowding in shelters risked the outbreak of epidemics. 1.8 million people were affected by a halt or reduction of the water supply, 138 schools and 26 health facilities[58][257][258] were damaged, 872 homes were totally destroyed or severely damaged, and the homes of 5,005 families were damaged but still inhabitable. Throughout the Gaza Strip, people received only 2 hours of electricity per day. Power outage had an immediate effect on the public health situation and reduced water and sanitation services, with hospitals becoming dependent on generators. On 2 September, UNRWA reported that 58,217 people were sheltering in 31 of their school buildings, a fifth of their buildings.[259]

OCHA estimated that at least 373,000 children required psychosocial support.[18] "Intense overcrowding, compounded by the limited access of humanitarian staff to certain areas, is increasingly undermining the living conditions at many shelters and raising protection concerns. Water supply has been particularly challenging..."[260] More than 485,000 internally displaced persons were in need of emergency food assistance.[58]

Gaza City, home to 500,000, suffered damage to 20-25% of its housing. Beit Hanoun, with 70% of its housing stock damaged, is considered uninhabitable, with 30,000 residents there in need of accommodation. The only power station in the Strip was damaged on 29 July, and the infrastructure of power transmission lines and sewage pumps was severely damaged, with a major sewage pipe catering to 500,000 badly damaged. Among the infrastructure targeted and destroyed by Israel's bombing campaign were 220 factories in various industrial zones, including a major carpentry enterprise, construction companies, a major biscuit factory, dairy farms and livestock, a candy manufacturer, the orange groves of Beit Hanoun, Gaza's largest mosques, and several TV stations. Farms, as a consequence of damage or the presence of unexploded ordnance dropped during the conflict, are often inaccessible, and the damage to agriculture was estimated at over $200 million. 10 out of 26 hospitals closed.[261][262][263]

According to the Palestinian Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, 203 mosques were damaged during the war, with 73 being destroyed completely.[264] Two of Gaza's three Christian churches were also damaged, with the third suffering some damage to peripheral buildings owned by the parish.[264] In the light of the damage to mosques, Manuel Musallam informed Muslims they could call their prayers from Christian churches.[265] In contrast to Operation Pillar of Defensive, which did not damage a single mosque, Israel maintained that Hamas had a routine military use of mosques and that made them legitimate military targets. According to the IDF, 160 rockets were launched from mosques during the war.[266][267] It also stated that mosques were used for weapon storage, tunnel entrances, training and gathering of militants.[268][269] In one Associated Press report, residents denied that mosques damaged by Israeli forces had been used for military purposes.[270]

Hamas and other Islamist groups in Gaza fired rockets and mortars at Israeli towns and villages. Despite Israel's use of the Iron Dome missile defense systems, six civilians were killed, including an Arab Israeli and a Thai civilian worker.[272] An Israeli teen was seriously injured in a rocket strike in the city of Ashkelon.[273] Medical health professionals have noted that Israeli teens prone to mental health problems suffer increasingly during both short-term and long-term conflicts. Experts have identified a number of mental health symptoms which rise during conflict, including anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, interpersonal sensitivity, phobias, and paranoia. There is some doubt whether these issues will dissipate after the conflict is resolved.[274]

Rocket attacks from Gaza caused damage to Israeli civilian infrastructure, including factories, gas stations, and homes.[275]

At the onset of the operation, the Israeli government canceled all programs within 40km (24 miles) of Gaza, and requested all people stay at home or near shelter. All summer camps were closed and universities canceled their final exams.[276] Additionally, all gatherings of 300 or more people were banned.[277] Due to the trajectory of rocket fire from Gaza, many flights in and out of Ben-Gurion Airport were delayed or rerouted.[278] and flights to Ben-Gurion airport were interrupted for some days after a Hamas rocket struck an area in its vicinity.[279] Hamas called the FAA flight ban a "great victory".[280]Michael Ross wrote that the decision was driven by anxiety and caused considerably more damage than the potential danger it prevented.[281]

Nearly 3,000 claims of damage were submitted to Israel's Tax Authority, which paid $20 million for direct damage and $21 million for indirect damage such as missed work days as of[when?].[46]

The Bedouin communities in the Negev, many unrecognised by the Israeli government, were classified as "open areas" and so their 200,000 residents did not have warning sirens or anti-rocket protection.[282]

Reports of casualties in the conflict have been made available by a variety of sources. Most media accounts have used figures provided by the government in Gaza or non-governmental organizations.[283]

Current reports of the proportion of those killed who were civilians/militants are incomplete, and real-time errors, intentional data manipulation, and diverse methodologies produce notable variations in various sides' figures.[284][285][286] For example, the Hamas-run Interior Ministry has issued instructions for activists to always refer to casualties as "innocent civilians" or "innocent citizens" in internet posts.[287][288] However, B'Tselem has stated that after the various groups finish their investigations, their figures are likely to end up about the same.[57] UNICEF and the Gaza Health Ministry reported that from 8 July to 2 August, 296315 Palestinian children died due to Israeli action, and 30% of civilian casualties were children;[289][290] by 27 August, the total number of children killed had risen to 495[18]578,[31] according to OCHA and the Gaza Health Ministry. In March 2015, OCHA reported that 2,220 Palestinians had been killed, of whom 1,492 were civilians (551 children and 299 women), 605 militants and 123 of unknown status.[291] According to ITIC, 48.7% of the identified casualties were militants[56] and in some cases children and women participated in military operations.[292]

Human rights groups and the UN use the Gaza Health Ministry's number of Palestinians killed in Gaza as preliminary and add to or subtract from it after conducting their own investigations. For example, human rights groups say that the casualty count provided by the Health Ministry most likely includes victims of Hamas executions, domestic violence, and natural deaths,[285] but they (the human rights groups) remove the accused collaborators (who were shot as close range) from their own counts.[293] Israel contends that the Health Ministry's casualty count also includes deaths caused by rocket or mortar malfunctions.[285]

According to the OCHA 2015 overview, of the 2,220 Palestinians killed in the conflict, 742 fatalities came from 142 families, who suffered the loss of 3 or more family members in individual bombing incidents on residential buildings.[291] According to data provided by the Palestinian International Middle East Media Center, 79.7% of the Palestinians killed in Gaza were male, with the majority between 16 and 35 (fighting-age). In contrast, a New York Times analysis states that males of ages that are most likely to be militants form 9% of the population but 34% of the casualties, while women and children under 15, who are least likely to be legitimate targets, form 71% of the general population and 33% of the casualties.[285][295] Israel has pointed to the relatively small numbers of fatalities among women, children and men over 60, and to instances of Hamas fighters being counted as civilians (perhaps due to the broad definition of "civilian" used by the Gaza Health Ministry), to support its view that the number of the dead who were militants is 4050%.[57] The IDF calculates that 5% of Gaza's military forces were killed in the war.[296] Jana Krause, from the war studies department at Kings College London, stated that "a potential explanation other than combatant roles" for the tendency of the dead to be young men "could be that families expect them to be the first ones to leave shelters in order to care for hurt relatives, gather information, look after abandoned family homes or arrange food and water."[286] ITIC reported instances in which children and teenagers served as militants, as well as cases where the ages of casualties reported by GHM were allegedly falsified, with child militants listed as adults and adults listed as children.[297]

Abbas said that "more than 120 youths were killed for violating the curfew and house arrest orders issued against them" by Hamas, referring to reports that Hamas targeted Fatah activists in Gaza during the conflict. Abbas said that Hamas also executed more than 30 suspected collaborators without trial.[298] He said that "over 850 Hamas members and their families" were killed by Israel during the operation.[299][300][301] During the fighting between Israel and Gaza, solidarity protests occurred in the West Bank, during which several Palestinians died; see Reactions.

During the conflict, 66 IDF soldiers were killed[302]:

Sgt. Shacar Shalev, 20, from Alonei HaBashan, Paratroopers Brigade, was critically injured on July 23 during combat in Gaza. He died from his wounds on August 31.

Sgt. Netanel Maman, 21, was critically injured in Ashdod on August 22. He died from his wounds on August 29.

Maj. Benaya Sarel, 26, commander of the Sayeret Givati Company, killed by Hamas in southern Gaza Strip. Lt. Hadar Goldin, 23, killed by Hamas in southern Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Liel Gidoni, 20, killed by Hamas in southern Gaza Strip.

Capt. (res.) Liran Adir (Edry), 31, killed operating along the border with the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Noam Rosenthal, 20, killed operating along the border with the Gaza Strip. Sgt. First Class (Res.) Daniel Marash, 22, killed operating along the border with the Gaza Strip. Cap. Omri Tal, 22, killed operating along the border with the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Shay Kushnir, 20, was killed operating along the border with the Gaza Strip.

Staff Sgt. Guy Algranati, 20, Sayeret Maglan, was killed in the southern Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Omer Hay, 21, Sayeret Maglan, was killed in the southern Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Matan Gotlib, 21, Sayeret Maglan, was killed in the southern Gaza Strip.

Sgt. Nadav Raimond, 19, killed in when combatants infiltrated Israel via a tunnel from Gaza. Sgt. Daniel Kedmi, 18, killed when combatants infiltrated Israel via a tunnel from Gaza. Sgt. Barkey Ishai Shor, 21, killed when combatants infiltrated Israel via a tunnel from Gaza. Sgt. Sagi Erez, 19, killed when combatants infiltrated Israel via a tunnel from Gaza. Sgt. Dor Dery, 18, killed when combatants infiltrated Israel via a tunnel from Gaza. Staff Sgt. Eliav Eliyahu Haim Kahlon, 22, was killed by mortar fire along the Gaza border. Cpl. Meidan Maymon Biton, 20, was killed by mortar fire along the Gaza border. Cpl Niran Cohen, 20, was killed by mortar fire along the Gaza border. Staff Sgt. Adi Briga, 23, was killed by mortar fire along the Gaza border. Staff Sgt. Moshe Davino, 20, was killed in the southern Gaza Strip.

Sgt. First Class (res.) Barak Refael Degorker, 27, was killed by mortar fire from the Gaza Strip. Chief Warrant Officer Rami Chalon, 39, died from his wounds after being injured on the Gaza border on Tuesday, July 22. Cap. Liad Lavi, 20, died from his wounds after being injured in combat in the southern Gaza Strip on Thursday, July 24. Staff Sgt. Avraham Grintzvaig, 21, was killed in combat in the northern Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Gal Bason, 21, Combat Engineering Corps, was killed in the northern Gaza Strip. Second Lieutenant Roy Peles, 21, was killed in combat in the Gaza strip.

Staff Sgt. Amit Yeori, 20,fell in combat in Gaza. Staff Sgt. Guy Boyland, 21, 7th Armored Brigade, killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Guy Levy, 21, killed by an anti-tank missile fired at the force from a structure. First Sgt. (Res.) Yair Ashkenazy, 36, killed in the northern Gaza Strip.

Lt. Elyahu, 22, Paratroopers Brigade, killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Li Mat, 19, Paratroopers Brigade, killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Shahar Dauber, 20, Paratroopers Brigade, killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. Capt. Dmitri Levitas, 26, killed by sniper fire in the Gaza Strip. Lt. Natan Cohen, 23, killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. Staff Sgt. Avitar Moshe Torjamin, 20, killed in a fire exchange in the southern Gaza Strip.

First Sgt. Ohad Shemesh, 27, killed while fighting Hamas. Sgt. First Class Oded Ben Sira, 22, killed by sniper fire. Lt. Col. Dolev Keidar, 38, Commander of the Geffen Battalion, killed by an anti-tank missile in an infiltration incident. Sgt. Major Bayhesain Kshaun, 39, killed by an anti-tank missile in an infiltration incident. Second Lt. Yuval Haiman, 21, killed by an anti-tank missile in an infiltration incident. Sgt. Nadav Goldmacher, 23, killed by an anti-tank missile in an infiltration incident. Staff Sgt. Tal Ifrach, 21, killed in battle in Gaza. Staff Sgt. Yuval Dagan, 22, killed in battle.

Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul, 22, from Poria Sgt. Shon Mondshine, 19, from Tel Aviv Staff Sgt. Jordan Bensemhoun, 22, from Ashkelon Staff Sgt. Moshe Malko, 20, from Jerusalem Sgt. Nissim Sean Carmeli, 21, from Raanana Sgt. Oz Mendelovich, 21, from Atzmon Sgt. Gilad Rozenthal Yacoby, 21, from Kiryat Ono Capt. Tsvi Kaplan, 28, from Meirav Maj. Tzafrir Baror, 32, from Holon Staff Sgt. Max Steinberg, 24, from Be'er Sheva Staff Sgt. Shachar Tase, 20, from Pardesiya Staff Sgt. Daniel Pomerantz, 20, from Kfar Azar Sgt. Ben Itzhak Vaanounou, 19, from Ashdod Staff Sgt. Oren Simcha Noach, 22, from Hoshaya

Staff Sgt. Bnaya Rubel, 20, from Holon was killed in battle. Second Lt. Bar Rahav, 21, was killed when an anti-tank missile hit his vehicle. Sgt. Adar Barsano, 20, was killed by Hamas, who infiltrated into Israel through a tunnel. Maj. (res.) Amotz Greenberg, 45, was killed by Hamas who infiltrated into Israel through a tunnel.

Staff Sgt. Eitan Barak, 20, was killed in a night operation in Gaza.

Also, among the dead were 5 Israeli civilians and 1 Thai civilian.[18][303] One other person died due to natural causes brought on by the conflict.[304] According to Magen David Adom, 837 civilians were treated for shock (581) or injuries (256): 36 were injured by shrapnel, 33 by debris from shattered glass and building debris, 18 in traffic accidents which occurred when warning sirens sounded, 159 from falling or trauma while on the way to shelters, and 9 in violence in Jerusalem and Maale Adumim.[305][306] 469 IDF soldiers were injured.[20]

The first Israeli civilian death occurred at the Erez border crossing with Gaza when a Chabad rabbi, delivering food and drinks on the front line,[307] was hit by mortar fire.[308] The second Israeli civilian killed was a 32-year-old Bedouin who was hit by a rocket in the Negev Desert.[309] A Thai migrant worker was also killed by mortar fire while working at a greenhouse in the Ashkelon Coast Regional Council.[310] In addition, an elderly woman in Wadi Nisnas collapsed and died of heart failure during an air-raid siren.[304] On 22 August, a 4-year-old Israeli child was killed by a mortar fired from Gaza.[311] A barrage of mortar fire killed two Israeli civilians in the Eshkol region, an hour before a ceasefire went into effect.[312]

Palestinian officials estimated on 4 September that, with 17,000 homes destroyed (and as of early August at least 30,000 partially destroyed)[313] by Israeli bombing, the reconstruction would cost $7.8 billion, which is about 3 times Gaza's GDP for 2011.[314][315] Gaza City suffered damage to 2025% of its housing and Beit Hanoun with 70% of its housing uninhabitable.[262]The New York Times noted that damage in this third war was more severe than in the two preceding wars, where in the aftermath of the earlier Operation Cast Lead the damage inflicted was $4 billion, 3 times the then GDP of Gaza's economy.[316] Strikes on Gaza's few industries will take years to repair. Gaza's main power plant on Salaheddin Road was damaged. Two sewage pumping stations in Zeitoun were damaged. The biggest private company in Gaza, the Alawda biscuit and ice cream factory, employing 400, was destroyed by a shelling barrage on 31 July, a few days after undertaking to supply its Choco Sandwich biscuits to 250,000 refugees in response to a request from the World Food Programme; other strikes targeted a plastics factory, a sponge-making plant, the offices of Gaza's main fruit distribution network, the El Majd Industrial and Trading Corporation's factory for cardboard box, carton and plastic bag production, Gaza's biggest dairy product importer and distributor, Roward International. Trond Husby, chief of the UN's Gaza development programme in Gaza, commented that the level of destruction now is worse than in Somalia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Uganda.[263]

A number of tunnels leading into both Israel and Egypt were destroyed throughout the operation. There were reports that the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt were bringing an estimated $700 million into Gaza's economy through goods or services. Several Palestinians argued that the tunnels had been critical to supporting the residents of Gaza, either through the employment they provided or through the goods that they allowed ingoods which were otherwise not available unless shipped through Egypt.[317] However, tunnels along the Israeli border serve a purely military purpose.[318]

During the ground invasion, Israeli forces destroyed livestock in Gaza. In Beit Hanoun, 370 cows were killed by tank shelling and airstrikes. In Beit Lahiya, 20 camels were shot by ground forces.[319] Israel's Minister of Finance estimated that the operation would cost Israel NIS 8.5 billion (approximately 2.5 billion USD), which is similar to Operation Cast Lead in 2009 and higher than Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. The forecast included military and non-military costs, including military expenditure and property damage. The calculation indicated that if the operation lasted 20 days, the loss in GDP would be 0.4%.[64]

International reactions to the 2014 IsraelGaza conflict came from many countries and international organizations around the world.

Canada was supportive of Israel[320] and critical of Hamas. The BRICS countries called for restraint on both sides and a return to peace talks based on the Arab Peace Initiative. The European Union condemned the violations of the laws of war by both sides, while stressing the "unsustainable nature of the status quo", and calling for a settlement based on the two-state solution. The Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab League, and most Latin American countries were critical of Israel, with some countries in the latter group withdrawing their ambassadors from Israel in protest. South Africa called for restraint by both sides and an end to "collective punishment of Palestinians".[citation needed]

There were many pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations worldwide, including inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. According to OCHA, 23 Palestinians were killed and 2,218 were wounded by the IDF (38% of the latter by live fire) during these demonstrations.[321][322][323]

Concerns were raised regarding rising anti-Semitism and related violence[where?] deemed related to the conflict.[324]

U.S. President Obama acknowledged Israel's right to defend itself, but urged restraint by both sides. Meanwhile, the United States Congress expressed vigorous support for Israel. It passed legislation providing Israel with an additional $225 million in military aid for missile defense with a bipartisan 395-8 vote in the House of Representatives and by unanimous consent in the Senate.[325] This was in addition to strong measures supporting Israel's position passed with overwhelming support in both houses.[326] Israel received strong statements of bipartisan support from the leadership and members of both houses of Congress for its actions during the conflict.

On 6 August 2014, thousands of Palestinians rallied in Gaza in support of Hamas, they demanded an end to the blockade of Gaza.[327][328] After the 26 August ceasefire, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a poll in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 79% of respondents said that Hamas had won the war and 61% said that they would pick Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as the Palestinian president, up from 41% before the war.[329]

According to The Washington Post, a percentage of Gazans held Hamas accountable for the humanitarian crisis and wanted the militants to stop firing rockets from their neighborhoods to avoid Israeli reaction.[330] Some of the Gazans have attempted to protest against Hamas, which routinely accuses protesters of being Israeli spies and has killed more than 50 such protesters.[331][332][unreliable source?] Around 6 August, Palestinian protesters reportedly attacked and beat up Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri because they blamed Hamas for inciting Operation Protective Edge.[333][334]

An unknown number of Palestinians, estimated in the hundreds or thousands, have tried to flee to Europe due to the conflict. The Palestinian rights group Adamir collected the names of 400 missing persons. In what was described by International Organization for Migration as the "worst shipwreck in years", a boat carrying refugees was rammed by smugglers and capsized off the coast of Malta, resulting in the deaths of about 400 people. According to interviews with survivors, they paid smugglers between $2,000-$5,000 or used legal travel permits, to get to Egypt. One refugee who died had considered the boat to be rickety but told his father "I have no life in Gaza anyway".[335][336]

A majority of the Israeli public supported Operation Protective Edge.[337][338] Nonetheless, there were protests throughout Israel, after which nearly 700 people were arrested,[why?] including 224 people from East Jerusalem. Most were subsequently released, but some face charges.[339][needs update]

There were continuous protests and clashes in the West Bank. The funeral of Mohammed Abu Khdeir on 4 July was joined by thousands of mourners, and was accompanied by clashes across east Jerusalem throughout the weekend.[340][needs update] According to OCHA, 23 Palestinians were killed and 2,218 were wounded by the IDF, 38% of the latter by live fire.[321][322][323] According to the PLO, 32 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank in the period 13 June 26 August, nearly 1400 were wounded by Israeli fire and 1,700 were detained in the largest offensive in the West Bank since the Second Intifada. The PLO also stated that 1,472 settlement homes had been approved over the summer.[341]

During the war there were over 360 attacks on Jews from the West Bank, a spate that was thought by the Jerusalem Post to have "peaked" on 4 August with a tractor attack in Jerusalem and the shooting of a uniformed soldier in the French Hill neighborhood, leading to an increase in security in the city.[342][343]

On 1 September, Israel announced a plan to expropriate 1,000 acres of land in the West Bank, reportedly as a "reaction to the deplorable murder in June of three Israeli teenagers", which Amnesty International denounced as the "largest land grab in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since the 1980s".[344][345] The EU complained about the land expropriation and warned of renewed violence in Gaza; the US called it "counterproductive".[346][347]

A number of legal and moral issues concerning the conflict arose during course of the fighting.[348] Various human rights groups have argued that both Palestinian rocket attacks and Israeli targeted destruction of homes of Hamas and other militia members violated international humanitarian law and might constitute war crimes, violations of international humanitarian law.[349][350][351]Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, accused Hamas militants of violating international humanitarian law by "locating rockets within schools and hospitals, or even launching these rockets from densely populated areas."[352] She also criticized Israel's military operation, stating that there was "a strong possibility that international law has been violated, in a manner that could amount to war crimes", and specifically criticizing Israel's actions in Gaza as disproportionate.[353]

Amnesty International found evidence that "[d]uring the current hostilities, Hamas spokespeople reportedly urged residents in some areas of the Gaza Strip not to leave their homes after the Israeli military dropped leaflets and made phone calls warning people in the area to evacuate", and that international humanitarian law was clear in that "even if officials or fighters from Hamas or Palestinian armed groups associated with other factions did in fact direct civilians to remain in a specific location in order to shield military objectives from attacks, all of Israel's obligations to protect these civilians would still apply."[354]B'tselem found that Hamas had breached provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), both firing from civilian areas and firing at Israeli civilian areas. It also stated that the Israeli policy of bombing homes, formulated by government officials and the senior military command, though claimed to be in conformity with IHL, was 'unlawful', and designed to 'block, a priori, any allegations that Israel breached IHL provisions', in that it relies on an interpretation that leaves 'no restrictions whatsoever on Israeli action' so that 'whatever method it chooses to respond to Hamas operations is legitimate, no matter how horrifying the consequences.'[355][356]

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh urged the Palestinian Authority to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC);[357] the fact that the PA has not done so yet has prevented the ICC from launching a formal investigation. [clarification needed] ICC prosecutor Geoffrey Nice said that a "decision to do nothing clearly emerges from the meeting" with the PA foreign minister Riad Malki.[358][359] The UNHRC has appointed a panel led by William Schabas to investigate war crimes allegations by both sides. Israel criticized Schabas as biased because he repeatedly made statements against Israel and in support of Hamas, and has announced its own investigations of both military and civilian leadership and the conduct during the war. Schabas denied any bias,[360][361] but on 2 February 2015 resigned from the position.[362] According to the New York Times, "Of 44 cases initially referred to army fact-finding teams for preliminary examination, seven have been closed, including one involving the death of eight members of a family when their home was struck on 8 July, the first day of the Israeli air campaign, and others are pending."[363] Human rights organizations have expressed little confidence in Israel's measures, citing past experience.[364] Moreover, several human rights organizations were denied access to Gaza by Israel, rendering it impossible for them to carry out on-site investigations.[365][366]B'Tselem has refused to participate in the army investigation.[363]

Twenty civilians from Shuja'iyya were killed while protesting against Hamas.[367] A few days later, Hamas reportedly killed two Gazans and wounded ten after a scuffle broke out over food handouts.[368]

The IDF stated on 31 July that more than 280 Hamas rockets[45] malfunctioned and fell inside the Gaza strip, hitting sites including Al-Shifa Hospital and the Al-Shati refugee camp, killing at least 11 and wounding dozens.[369] Hamas denied that any of its rockets hit the Gaza Strip.,[45][370][371] but Palestinian sources said numerous rocket launches ended up falling in Gaza communities and that scores of people have been killed or injured. Israeli Military sources said the failed Hamas launches increased amid heavy Israeli air and artillery strikes throughout the Gaza Strip. They said the failed launches reflected poorly-assembled rockets as well as the rush to load and fire projectiles before they are spotted by Israeli aircraft.[372] While the Al-Shifa Hospital incident is disputed, early news reports have suggested that the strike was from an Israeli drone missile.[369][373][374] Amnesty International concluded that the explosion at the Shati refugee camp on July 28 in which 13 civilians were killed was caused by a Palestinian rocket, despite Palestinian claims it was an Israeli missile.[375]

During the conflict, Hamas executed Gazan civilians it accused of having collaborated with Israel; thirty on 30 July;[376] forty-six on 21/22 August,[377][378] including twenty-five as part of a campaign codenamed "Strangling Necks"; four on 23 August;[379] and eighteen more at other times. Overall, Hamas executed between 30-40 suspected collaborators during Operation Protective Edge alone, according to Abbas.[298][301] Abbas condemned the executions, calling them murders and a crime.[380][381]

Abbas' Secretary-General, Al-Tayyib Abd al-Rahim, condemned the "random executions of those who Hamas called collaborators", adding that some of those killed had been detained for more than three years.[382][383] Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Palestinian human rights groups condemned the executions.[384][385][386] Bodies of the victims were brought to hospitals to be added to the number of civilian casualties of Israeli operation.[293] According to a Shin Bet official, "not even one" of the alleged collaborators executed by Hamas provided any intelligence to Israel, while the Shin Bet officially "confirmed that those executed during Operation Protective Edge had all been held in prison in Gaza in the course of the hostilities."[387]

Senior Hamas official Moussa Abu Marzouk confirmed that some victims were kept under arrest before the conflict began and were executed to satisfy the public without due legal procedure.[388]

Shurat HaDin filed a suit with the ICC charging Khaled Mashaal with war crimes for the executions of 38 civilians.[388][389] Hamas co-founder Ayman Taha was found dead; Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported he had been shot by Hamas for maintaining contact with the intelligence services of several Arab countries; Hamas stated he was targeted by an Israeli airstrike.[390]

On May 26, 2015 Amnesty International released a report saying that Hamas carried out extrajudicial killings, abductions and arrests of Palestinians and used the Al-Shifa Hospital to detain, interrogate and torture suspects. It details the executions of at least 23 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel and torture of dozens of others, many victims of torture were members of the rival Palestinian movement, Fatah.[391][392]

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accused Hamas militants of violating international humanitarian law by "locating rockets within schools and hospitals, or even launching these rockets from densely populated areas."[352] The European Union condemned Hamas, and in particular condemned "calls on the civilian population of Gaza to provide themselves as human shields."[393][394] Confirmation of this practice was produced by correspondents from France24, The Financial Times, and RT, who respectively filmed a rocket launch pad which was placed in a civilian area next to a hotel where international journalists were staying,[395] reported on rockets being fired from near Al-Shifa Hospital, and reported on Hamas firing rockets near a hotel.[396] In September 2014, a Hamas official acknowledged to an Associated Press reporter that the group had fired rockets from civilian areas.[397]

While the Israeli government repeatedly stated that many civilian casualties were the result of Hamas using the Gazan population as human shields[398] several British media organizations (including The Guardian, and The Independent) dismissed such claims as "myths"[399][400] and the BBC's Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen likewise said he "saw no evidence of Hamas using Palestinians as human shields."[401] Additionally the London-based NGO, Amnesty International, dismissed such claims, stated it was unable to verify them and emphasized that even if they were true the IDF would still have a responsibility to protect civilians.[49][402]

The statements fall into two categories: using civilian structures like homes, mosques and hospitals to store munitions in or launch rockets from,[403] and urging or forcing civilian population to stay in their homes, to shield militants.[404][405] Israeli soldiers have also said Hamas operatives directly employed women and children as involuntary human shields to evade pursuit,[406][407] while Hamas and others have said such accusations are false.[408]Asa Kasher, who helped to write the Israel Defense Forces's Code of Conduct, argued that "Israel cannot forfeit its ability to protect its citizens against attacks simply because terrorists hide behind non-combatants. If it did so, it would be giving up any right to self-defense."[409]

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